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(i)
SUMMARY OF THE PAPER
The paper presents a report of an investigation of the developtuent
and use of computer-based financial planning models in the decision-
making and control process of profit-directed organizations.
The discussion is supported by research case studies from 18 com-
panies. Amongst these, 16 had proceeded with the development of model-
ing systems, while two had considered the approach but decided against
it. Within the 16 companies which had proceeded with the development of
models, 20 models, or modeling systems, were examined. Some of these
were in various stages of development, others were implemented, and one
had already failed in use and been discarded. Six of the companies had
fairly mature, successfal modeling systems, widely and continually used
in their organizations
-
An explanation and analysis of the modeling support process is
developed by reference to the underlying characteristics of the decision-
making process in organizations, particularly as it is shaped by the
need to deal with the dual problems of complexity and uncertainty. In
their information structures and formal logics, financial planning models
are observed primarily to be simulations of the enterprise, seldom incor-
porating technically sophisticated decision-science methodologies, such
as probabilistic formiilations or objective functions with associated op-
timizing algorithms. Despite this, successful models are observed to be
the product of sophisticated reasoning applied at the design stage, reason-
ing which has to deal with two main issues.. On the one hand, a large
amount of complexity has to be distilled into a model's information and
logic structures , in such a way as to make the model reasonably efficient
in its data requirements and processing characteristics, while at the
same time effectively preserving a clear cognitive connection with the
reality of the intended decision focus and business situation to which
the model relates. And on the other hand, subsequent use of the model
has to be anticipated in respect to the way it is likely to support the
organization in the process of identifying and dealing with uncertainty.
In a division-of-labor sense, models appear principally to be created to
handle the complexity aspect of the managerial problem, leaving managers
to deal with uncertainty, both external uncertainty, arising from the
uncontrolled environment, and internal uncertainty, arising from the pro-
cess of trading off amongst multiple goals and the resolution of organi-
zational conflict.
The design issues referred to in the previous paragraph may appear
to be formidable. Fortunately, they do not have to be resolved all at
once cind forever. Analysing model development as a process, it appears
to follow some recognizable patterns. In the first instance, modeling
can be seen to be concerned simply with automating established informa-
tion processing procedirres in the areas of planning and budgeting. This
effort is usually contained within one department. From this beginning,
an increasing decision focus is developed within the modeling structure,
and use of the model becomes more obtrusive and widespread in the infor-
mation processing and decision making procedures of the organization.
The decision focus is developed within the structure of the main infor-
mation processing model. But, in addition, subsidiary models are often
n4^ni3
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developed to address specific sub-sets of the total set of decisions in
the organization. Progressively, one observes a proliferation of models,
linked loosely, through the organization's administrative procedures,
with the main inforination processing model. The subsidiary, decision-
specialized models, are rnore likely to incorporate sophisticated, decision-
science techniques because of their specific ajid limited decision focus.
Eventually, attention may be directed towards a more formal integration
of the models being used in the organization, with the aim at least of
attaining a degree of commonality of data and parameter definitions, and
beyond that of exploring a more formal linkage of model structures.
Within the research sample, a wide diversity of types of models
were obserr^ed in successful use, applied to various stages of planning,
decision making, monitoring and analysis of performance. An approach to
a typology of planning models is proposed, using as a focus the Vancil-
Lorange framework for analysing the organizational planning process-
However, even within a general typology it is still essential to recog-
nize that the specific factors of concern to a particular organization,
in terms of the sources and nature of the main uncertainties faced, the
degree of complexity of the enterprise, and the strategic posture and
direction adopted by the organization, do cause differences in the design
features and usage modes of models.
The potential of computer-based modeling support systems is amply
demonstrated by the research study. Use of this technology enables an
increased differentiation of organizational control strategies, especially
in respect to the different requirements stemming from the management of
vmcertainty and risk on the one hand, and the management of established
operations to produce optimal results on the other hand. Greater avail-
ability of information in the organization permits a v/ider involvement
in the planning process, greater frequency and flexibility of planning,
and a shift of the focus of control from a retrospective mode to an
anticipator/ mode. The rrar.n problems involved in de /eloping this poten-
tial are no longer technical, but rather are concerned with the manage-
ment of changes in traditional patterns of information sharing and use
in organizations.
For the future, one can expect to see a sustained and rapid growth
in the use of modeling systems to support managerial planning, decision
making, monitoring and analysis of performance. Organizations in the van-
guard of this development will probably be concerned with three main
issues: the extent to which formal modeling logics can be extended to
include aspects of the relevant environment of the enterprise; the use
of simulation methods to explore the functioning of the organization
itself; and the extent to which efficient data processing methods can
be progressively introduced within established modeling support activi-
ties, for example, the use of communication networks to link up data
bases by means of automatic data transfer.
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INTRODUCTION
Several authors have indicated a rapid increase during the 1970's in the
development and use of computer-based models to support planning and decision
making in organizations. Naylor and Schauland [71], for example, report a
survey on this subject sent to almost 2,000 corporations in the U.S., Canada
and Europe at the end of 1974 and, by comparing their results with those of
a similar siirvey conducted by Gershefshi [23] in 1959, conclude that the
field is characterized by dramatic growth. Traenkle, et al [88], in a
survey conducted under the auspices of the Financial Executive's Research
Foundation, show that over 80% of the 112 current financial models included
in their data were initiated in, or subsequent to, 1969 (page 15) . Grinyer
and Wooller [30,31], in the U.K., present research results from which they
observe that "...the annual rate at which corporate modeling was started
did not quicken much until 1970" ([31], page 6). Their evidence suggests, however,
that growth since then has been rapid and sustained. They relate the growth
of computer-based modeling to the pace of development of formal planning
at the corporate level as a specific and relatively distinct activity
within the administrative systems of organizations. Nayior (68] in a recent
article makes this same connection and describes five sets of problems which
he perceives to have caused managements to give greater emphasis to formal-
ized planning and modeling support. Notably, all five of these problem
sets relate to adverse changes in the environment which have created signi-
ficant uncertainties for business organizations.
There is considerable confusion in the literature about the
precise nature of the phenomenon which is variously described under the
captions "corporate models," "corporate planning models," "strategic, and
long-range planning models," "financial planning rrodels," or more simply
"planning models." Boulden [9] makes a distinction between "report
generators," computer programs developed to reduce the clerical effort
associated with planning, and "corporate modeling" which he characterizes
as involving a formal capability for data handling, decision search,
simulation of all areas of the organization, and modeling of interrelation-
ships amongst variables. He also distinguishes between corporate modeling
and an organization's management information system, where the latter
has as its function the accumulation of operating data on a real time
basis and at primary levels of detail.
All three surveys referred to previously indicate quite lov; costs
and relatively short lead times for model development, suggesting that the
types of models being developed in the 1970 's differ from the very costly
large models and associated data bases which appeared to be characteristic
of modeling in the 1960's. Gershefski [24], for example, gives a detailed
account of the corporate model developed at the Sun Oil Company in tlie mid-
1960' s, and further examples are contained in a collection of descriptions
of models at the end of the '60's in the book edited by Schreiber [79].
Even allowing for the significant decline in computer costs, and for savings
which are likely to have accrued from greater experience with modeling, it
seems clear that the nature and type of models are changing, and that
many models in practice probably fall short of the criteria specified by Boulden.
Another feature of the literature on modeling support of the planning
process at the end of the 1960 's and early 1970*3, as provided by managerial
researchers rather than model builders, is the fairly general conclusion
that modeling has been failing to accomplish its primary aim of enhancing
managerial effectiveness. Kail [34], for example, poses the question, "are
top managers finding [strategic planning models] useful?" Based on his
findings from a study of the use of models in 17 companies in a wide variety
of industries he concludes they are not. He traces the reasons for failure
to erroneous assumptions on the part of modelers about the nature of plan-
ning, inadequate consideration of the role a model is expected to perform
in the planning process, a tendency to develop normative, assertive models
rather than supportive models , a sim.plistic view of cause-and-effect rela-
tionships amongst variables in the models, and isolation of model develop-
ment from the planning process. Presumably, however, as evidenced by the
rapid adoption more recently of modeling support, it may be reasonable to
assume that a higher degree of success is now being achieved. Perhaps the
reasons for earlier failures, as identifiec' by Hall and others, are being
recognized and acted upon, and smaller, less comprehensive models may now
be finding their way into the visceral heart of the managerial process of
organizations; this would be consistent with lower costs and shorter
development lead times of models. If so, the question posed by Hall, and
ajnply reinforced by many other authors in terms of their assertion of the
1 In this context, "normative" and "assertive" are associated with an
optimizing form of model. Strictly speaking, no model, in and of it-
self, can be either of these, since these are political and behavioral
terms. A model can only be instrumental to a normative, or assertive,
purpose in conjunction with the organizational and interpersonal dyna-
mics of the situation in which it is developed and used. Hall notes
that models are indeed used in this way, either naively or with intent.
need for top management involvement in model development and use, may
increasingly contain a misdirected emphasis. The important issue is whether
or not models are contributing to the improvement of decision making in
organizations, not necessarily whether they are contributing directly
to top mariagements' deliberations on strategic issues and choices.
Keen [47] addresses this question in an insightful article, and concludes
there is little, if any, justification for the emphasis on having managers
directly interact with models, an unrealistic stipulation which is likely
only to delay the effective harnessing of the computer's power to assisting
with important categories of organizational problems. A steady improve-
ment in planning methods, which may at least in part stem from model
usage, is likely to contribute to the quality of analysis, speed and
accuracy of processing relevant information and the range of options con-
sidered in providing analytical support to managements' decision-making
efforts; managements' precise awareness of the source of improvements in
the support they receive may be of relatively little, or at least of
secondary, importance.
THE RESEARCH
The investigation was motivated by a curiosity about the nature of
models which are being used to support the decision process in profit-
directed organizations, the applications for v/hich they are being used,
and the problems v/hich are encountered in the process of model decision,
selection i development and implementation. Given the growth in this field
of computer application, it is an important topic in its own right. However,
it was considered essential, in the spirit of Mason and Mitroff's suggested
framework [53 ] , to conduct the enquiry within a broad organizational frame-
work of the nature of the enterprise, the responsibility structvure and the
planning and decision-making procedures used by the organization, and its
general data processing and information support capabilities. It is within
this contextual framework that the role of formal models in helping to deal
with the complexity and uncertainty inherent in organizational decision
making has to be observed and explained. From a managerial standpoint
it is, after all, the instrumentality of modeling which is of direct
interest, not simply the nature of a model itself. No doubt the two are
connected, which is an important consideration, but the appropriate empha-
sis on modeling, as an activity of theoretical and pragmatic interest,
should be the cognitive structures used by individuals and organizations
in controlling the decision-making process , and the way in which models •,
relate to that cognitive structure in enhancing the organization's managerial
capabilities.
The literature on specific model development is quite extensive, but
in the main it concentrates on the structure and technical features of
models themselves, leaving implicit or ignoring altogether the organiza-
tional context and the decision-making impact of models in use. The sur-
vey literature, on the other hand, tends to be too general to provide in-
sight to the different characteristics of models r and associated relation-
ships between and amongst model forms, organizational context, and the
managerial problems to which the models are applied. The current research
attempts to strike a middle grovmd between these extremes by including a
sufficiently large number of modeling efforts to permit some evaluation of
the consistency of the research observations with those derived from con-
siderably larger popiiLations , and yet small enough to allow a deeper and
broader investigation of the phenomenon. The research data is analyzed in
several ways, including treatment of the total sample with a view to pro-
posing some general conditions about nodels and the modeling process, pair-
wise comparisons to draw out similarities and differences between modeling
situations, and discussion of individual cases with a view to explaining
and analyzing specific aspects of the modeling process.
Eighteen companies in mainufacturing industries were included in the
study. Two of them had considered modeling but decided not to proceed.
In the other 16 companies 20 models, or modeling systems, were obser^/ed.
The greater number of models than companies arose from the fact that in
some organizations separate modeling efforts were sustained at corporate
and divisional levels and these were researched as distinct, loosely-coupled
systems. The com.panies were selected on an opportunistic basis, with no
effort to design a sample which would be representative of any particular
population. However, they were chosen with a view to gaining insight to
different phases of modeling support - a weak longitudinal design. Thus,
within the sample were companies which had decided against the use of
models, at least for the time being, companies in the process of developing
models but not yet having i.molemented them, and companies which had already
developed and implemented models in support of at least some aspects of
their decision-making process. Six of the companies had a variety of
models, used intensively throughout the organization in support of most
aspects of their planning, decision making and monitoring of performance.
In addition, to compare the results achieved between in-house and external
systems, the sample included companies using a commercial system on external
time sharing, companies using commercial systems developed and used inter-
A considerable amount of modeling work, both in practice and in terms
of theoretical development, has been conducted in the banking industry.
Cohen and Rutenberg (14] provide an excellent survey of this work.
However, because of the differences between manufacturing industry and
the financial services industry — e.g. real rather than financial asset
choices — it was decided to restrict the current study to miuiufacturing
industry.
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nally, and companies using systems developed and used entirely internally.
The intent was to interview in each company a range of persons -
managers in line positions, in planning and control positions, in modeling
and systems support positions, and in data processing positions. This
coverage was possible in several of the companies but not in all of them,
while in yet others, for example in companies which had decided not to
proceed with a modeling effort, it was not considered necessary.- A struc-
tured research guide was used in interviewing, and additional data were
obtained from documents such as lOK Reports ^ organization charts , planning
and reporting manuals and model documentation manuals. A description of
the research companies is contained in Table 1.
CONCSPTUi^JL FRAMEWORK
Before discussing the field data, some explanation is required of the
conceptual framework which was used to guide the research and to explain
the observations which were made. The intellectual focus of the v;ork was
developed around the idea of controlling dtcision making in an organizational
context, and the development of formal information systems to support and
facilitate the decision process. The next sub-section presents aii initial
schema for categorizing information systems in organizations. This is
followed by a discussion of one of the main categories identified, ncunely
decision support systems, and the role of computer-based planning models
within that general category.
Information Systems for Organizational Decision and Control
By adopting a characterization of management as a decision-making
process in an organizational context, the analysis of information needs,
defined by reference to flows of decisions which are, or v;hich perhaps should
be being made, and the design of formal systems to provide at least part of
o
TABLE 1 (continued)
a) Size :
Very large (over $1 billion in sales) 8
Large ($500 million - $1 billion) 5
Medium ($100 - 500 million) 3
Small (below $100 million)
_6
22
Range - from about $5 million to about $10 billion in sales.
b) Business Diversity ;
Single business (one product range) 12
Dominated (diverse, but substantially dominated by one
type of business) 3
Diverse/ dominated (well along in the process of
diversifying from a traditional business) A
Diverse (several major lines of business, but employing
common types of technology) 2
Conglomerate (several major lines of business, with no
commonality of technology)
_1
22
c) Geographic Scope ;
Regional (operations and sales substantially
concentrated in a part of the country) 3
Domestic (operations and sales nationwide)
^
8
International (operations and sales in several countries) H^
22
Export sales were not considered to constitute an international
scope of operation.
d) Logistics Complexity
Low (operations do not involve a high level of logistics
complexity, or else, at the organizational level studied,
logistic complexity is not a matter of managerial focus
because of low levels of operating interdependence
amongst organizational sub-units) 8
Moderate 5
High
_9
22
10.
e) Relevant Environrr.enc
:
Placid/clustered (relatively slow change in the
environment, no major power structure to the
industry, dispersed suppliers and customers) 6
Disturbed/reactive (dynamic, but reasonably predictable
change in the environment, concentration of power in a
few competitors and customers, new products and contracts
major, infrequent events) 6
Turbulent (rapidly changing environment, interconnected
events and high levels of political uncertainty) 9
Ilixed (depends on the particular subsidiary)
_1
22
f) Funds Availability:
Scarce (financial policies and funds required by
existing operations cause an excess of demand for
funds over availability) 3
Balanced (requirements and availability in approximate
equilibrium) 6
Surplus (existing business generating more funds than
can profitably be re-invested) 5
Subsidiary (availability of funds managed elsewhere in
the organization)
_8
22
g) Strategic Emphasis:
Stable (maintaining position in chosen line of business
and market area) 9
Market expansion (program to extend existing product
lines into new market areas) 2
Internal expansion (new product and new market
development programs using internal resources) 3
Internal/acquisition (internal development, but some
concern for acquisition as a means of growth) 2
Mixed (depends on the particular subsidiary) 1
Acquisition (major emphasis on acquisition as means of
growth)
_3
22
1
These categorisations of the relevant environment follow the definitions
provided by E>.ery and Trist [22].
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that information, recommends itself as a powerful approach to the task of
improving managerial, and therefore organizational, effectiveness. This
is not intended to imply a sharp distinction, either conceptually or in
practice, between the managers in an organization and its formal information
systems. Quite the contrary, a more constructive and realistic view is to
consider the organization as an information-processing and decision-making
entity. The division of labor between managers and formal data processing
systems is essentially a secondary issue, albeit an important one, which
follows from an analysis of the nature and flows of information required
to achieve an effective fit between the organization, the tasks in which
it is engaged, and its environment. Moreover, the artificial distinction
which in frequently made in the literature between "plajining" on the one
hand and "control" on the other can be dispelled- Studies of decision
making as an intellectual process, in the tradition of cognitive psycho-
logy, concentrate on individuals as decision makers and therefore give
little emphasis to two aspects which are vitally important in managing
the process in organizations. The first of these aspects is the problem
of ensuring timely recognition of the need for a decision. And the second,
which we shall discuss at this point, concerns the interaction between the
development of future-orientated information as a context for decision
making and the implementation and feedback loops which allow an-ongoing
modification of decisions. Faced with a problem reqxiiring a decision, infor-
mation gathering and its processing in a planning, or anticipatory, mode
i;ilon [20] presents a comprehensive discussion of decision making as an
intellectual process, relating it to information processing, utility theory
and game theory, and pointing to the analogy of a formal organi::ational
capability for control of decision making. However, he does not extend
his framework explicitly into the context of a dynamic organizational process.
12.
is ail activity aimed at assessing and reducing the uncertainty in the
situation. In an organizational context, however, a central aspect of
a theory of control of the decision process is the idea that the robust-
ness of the organization's feedback and adjustment loops, in terms of their
sensitivity to subsequent monitoring and evaluation of the outcomes of deci-
sions once implemented, is a significant factor affecting the assessment
of risk at the decision-making stage, that is to say, at the point of
psychological commitment to a particular course of action- Therefore, while
planning is concerned, at least in part, with reducing ex-ante the probability
of wrong decisions, feedback and adjustment mechanisms are aimed at reducing
ex-post the cost to an organization of wrong decisions, or at any rate of
decisions which, with the resolution of some of the initial uncertainty by
virtue of the passage of time and the gaining of additional relevant experience,
are judged to have been less than optimal. Both planning and the ability to
adapt implementation are interactive in the dynamic control of the decision
flows in an organization - they are dual aspects of the control process.
Conceptual development in the area of controlling decision making in
organizations has been extremely dynamic dxiring the past ten to fifteen years;
and the related area of information processing has been equally dynamic.
Typically in the past the entrepreneurial drive of organizations has led
the concomitant development of formal administrative procedures and infor-
mation systems for managing the decision-making process. This time gap
probably increased during the 1960 's when U.S. business, benefiting from
rapid technological development from, for example, the space program, and
on the wave of growing economic prosperity in the U.S. and throughout the
world, aggressively moved in to new markets, both in terms of products and
applications and in terms of geographical diversity. This e.xpansion brought i
13.
with it a new set of administrative problems; however, concurrent develop-
ments in data processing technology held the promise of radical solutions.
The main thrust of data processing development at this time v/as focused on
a "total", or "integrated", information systems approach. This approach,
at its most extreme, required the development of comprehensive data bases
for storing all the relevamt information for an organization, and the
development of an extensive range of data retrieval and application programs
for making the information available to the organization in the various
forms required for the whole range of planning, decision making and monitor-
ing activities. It was an ambitious scenario, one which has largely not
been realized, for two main reasons. First, the technical capability of
data processing was considerably more limited than generally supposed.
And secondly, the enqphasis was on the development of technical solutions,
to the exclusion of consideration of the normative and behavioral dimensions
of the problem. Some authors, for example Dearden [16], rejected the whole
concept of information systems development as it was being pursued at that time.
The prevailing managerial climate of the 1970 's is vastly different
from that of the preceding decade. The economic do'^^ntum and monetary
uncertainty have, at least for the moment, blunted the entrepreneurial
drive. Many of the problems concerning the control of the decision-making
process in large diverse organizations remain to be dealt with. Nevertheless,
the climate of opinion concerning the potential of data processing and infor-
mation support systems appears to have shifted from the pessimism which arose
as a reaction to earlier inflated promises of solutions and the attendant
failures, to one of guarded optimism. At the same time design philosophy
has changed markedly. Scott Morton [80], in an influential work, developed
clearly the distinction between "transaction processing" systems and
"decision support" systems, a more general and comprehensive treatment
of the distinction drawn by Boulden between "corporate modeling" and
"management information systems" referred to earlier. In a further
development of this work, Gorry and Scott Morton [23] draw on Simon's [92]
classification of decisions and Anthony's [5] analysis of the management
process to derive a matrix to guide the tailoring of specific information
systems to the characteristics of the types of decisions within each
element of the matrix. Thus, they advocate a differentiated approach to
the development of information systems, in sharp contrast to the total,
integrated philosophy which was previously dominant.
V/ithin the same general theme addressed by Scott Morton, many authors
J
have begun to develop concepts derived from learning theory and applied these
to the process of designing and implementing information systems. Ackoff [2]
clearly established this as a focus in an early article. And Little [53 1,
in a broadly-based discvission of the relationship between modelers, models
and managers, conceives of the process as an interactive one, where model
validation and learning go hand- in-hand over time. Thus, these authoi's
appear to support the view that a steady incrementalism is liJcely to be a
more appropriate and effective strategy for the development of information
systems than the "grand design" approach implied by the total, integrated
philosophy.
It has to be acknowledged, however, that much of an organization's
data processing and information systems activity is in reality an intrinsic
part of the organization's production process (Hax [40]). Consequently, a
substantial component of the effort can be treated in a purely technical way, with th
15.
design criteria being derived in much the same manner as industrial engineers
approach the design of the logistics of manufacturing and distribution systems.
At least part of the problem of the literature of the subject stems from
a semantic confusion, with authors using identical or similar terminology
when discussing different issues and phenomena; and indeed vice versa.
Within the literatiire, three descriptive captions emerge as having signifi-
cance in the sense of conveying different design emphases, and which at
the same time are widely used. These are: management control system,
management information system, and decision support system. All three
relate to decision making in an organizational context and therefore over-
lap to a considerable extent, even though they imply a differentiation of
emphasis. The first, however, is seldom discussed directly in relation to
computer-based data processing, while the latter two typically are.
Any form of data processing and information provision, formal or
otherwise, relies upon a model - a model for directing attention to parti-
cular events in the world and for assembling data or observations into
information,- that is to sa^ Into a form which conveys meaning and signifi-
cance to decision makers. By referring to meaning and significance we are
inevitably suggesting a normative content to information ajid the underlying
models. Therefore, the idea of a model, and a normative versus descrip-
tive distinction applied to models, does not truly provide a distinguishing
feature in any absolute sense by which to categorize one design emphasis
from another. Rather, one has to refer to the intended instrumentality
of each in respect to the administration of an organization, and perhaps
Despite this assertion, it has to be admitted that both the idea of a
specific model, as a conceptual entity, and the distinction in a relative
sense between descriptive and normative models, are useful in an operational
context, and are in fact used in this paper.
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to a logical sequencing through time, in a dynamic conceptualization of
the process, of the way each operates on the control of decision niaking.
A management control system is perceived as acting on the goal struc-
tures of individuals, attempting in an on-going way to synthesize and at
least partially define a collectivity of goals, whichi might realistically
be referred to as an organizational goal structure, and to relate this to
individual goal structures of the organization members. In a decision m.aking
context the choice criteria used are assumed to be a function of the goal
structures of the individuals concerned. Thus, the literature of management
control focuses centrally on the concept of "goal congruence", the idea of
creating an identity between the goal structures of individuals and a more
general goal stnjctiire of the organization of which they are members (see,
for example, Vancil [90]). The intellectual focus is concerned with facili-
tating the process used for definition and communication of goals, deriva-
tion of performance measures consistent with goals, and the evaluation of
actxial performance in relation to these as a basis for administering orgcini-
zational rewards and penalties in such a way as to sustain motivation towards
organizational goal achievement. The management control perspective, there-
fore, is fundamentally normative, central to the very idea of an organization
as a purposeful, goal-directed entity.
A ip^nagement information perspective, in contrast, is perceived as
enhancing decision makers' cognitive structures; that is to say, the main
design emphasis is descriptive, with the purpose of expanding decision
makers' observational capacities and understanding of the workings of rele-
vant events and entities in the world with which the organization is concerned.
A large component of the data processing and reporting effort of an organiza-
tion is usually devoted to monitoring types of information. At the heart of
17.
this activity is the creation and maintenance of a transaction data base.
Much of the data which goes into this is defined by reference to technical
and legal imperatives of the tasks in v/hich the organization is engaged.
Alongside the transaction data base is an accoxinting data base, the design
of which is driven by the rules and procedures of accounting, and by the
organization's choice of accounting policies where discretion in these
matters exists. Additionally, other data bases are typically created to
capture and store descriptions of a flow of events, beyond the immediate
transactions of the enterprise, but which nevertheless are judged to have
relevance in explaining (and anticipating) the behavior of the enterprise;
examples of these might be data on labor performance, such as turnover,
absenteeism and grievances, or external data such as a monitoring of compe-
titors' actions, labor market conditions, supplier markets, and financial
markets. These data bases feed into processing models and report generat-
ing programs to provide a regiolar and routinized flow of information about
the way in which the enterprise and selected aspects of the environment
are benaving. Decision ma.<ers may also be permitted access to data in a
non-routine way to support ffarther analysis than is provided by the routine
reporting. Therefore, while monitoring systems are primarily descriptive
in the first instance, they shade into the decision suppc»rt area by providing
or facilitating analysis aimed at directing action. The insertion of a model
of the organization structure in the processing sequence of the reporting
system enables an analysis of the performance of the enterprise and its com-
ponents in relation to responsibility centers, that is to say an identifi-
caiton between performance and the organizational components responsible for
producing aspects of the total performance. Here again, a monitoring system
begins to depart from a purely descriptive mode, moving towards an evalua-
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tive purpose, at least in the sense of judging whether or not reported
performance appears to be optimal in the prevailing circumstances. More-
over, by relating performance and responsibility, the evaluation, whether
Intentionally or not, quickly enters the realm of reflecting on the com-
petence, and perhaps motivation, of the managers of responsibility centers,
thereby sustaining goal-directed behavior as specified by the management
control system.
The main purpose of a monitoring system then is to describe what is,
or what has, been happening - to report on the results of the collectivity
of decisions which have already been made. Decision making, on the other
hand, is inevitably concerned with anticipating the future and judging
alternative present and future actions in the light of their projected con-
sequences for prospective performance. The idea of a decision support
system relates directly to this activity. It suggests the creation of data
bases, calculating logics and report, generators to assist decision makers in
creating future scenarios within which to assess the relative desirability
of considered courses of action. Less directly, a iiicision support system
may also be conceived of as supporting goal formation and direction setting
rather than the resolution of specific decision alternatives. Alter [3],
from an examination of 56 decision support systems in a number of organiza-
tions, identifies a wide range of types in terms of their sophistication and
in terms of the way in which they impinge on the decision process. He creates
a typology by reference to the degree to which action is implied by the out-
put of a system. For example, inclusion in the calculating logic of a goal
structure and algorithm for making an optimal choice in relation to the spe-
cified goal structure is perceived as giving a system an assertive quality
vis-a-vis decision makers. Systems of this type are usually tailored to a
particular decision set, of a fairly well defined character, such as inven-
tory replenishment. Other forms of decision support system do not include
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goal structures and decision-making algorithms, but are simply descriptive
simulations; as such, they may have relatively little assertive force, but
instead are more supportive in the way they interact with decision makers in
producing decisions.
The output format of a decision support system may look similar, even
identical, to the output of the organization's monitoring systems. This is
understandable, since the monitoring systems are designed to provide a signi-
ficant and meaningful representation, ex-post , of the system being managed,
and therefore the same representation should for many purposes be suitable
for the ex-ante purpose of decision making. In fact, the same calculating and
report generating logics may be used in both, especially in the case of a deci-
sion support system which is simulating the total enterprise or substantial
components of it. This has the advantage of providing decision-support output
in a format which is already familiar to users. The anticipatory mode of the
system is created through the formation of planning data bases for the system
to work on, rather than through the calculating logic of the system itself.
However, i-"; i:; jnlikely that the logic and represantatio.ial format relevant
to on-going monitoring and operational decision making, as typically embodied
in the management information, or monitoring systems, will be appropriate
for the whole range of decision making in an organization. Therefore, in
some instances it would seem reasonable to expect within a range of support
systems in an organization some which have computational logics and output
formats significantly different from those of the monitoring systems, par-
ticularly in organizations which are re-assessing their goals and strategic
direction, 'ondertaking new ventures, or devising new ways of conducting their
existing operations.
In summary then, a management control system is distinguished from
either a monitoring or a decision support system by virture of its essentially
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normative purpose in relation to the problem of defining an organizational goal
structure and creating a degree of identity between this and the individual
goal structxires of decision makers in the organization. Monitoring systems are
distinguished from decision support systems primarily by reference to the time
dimension (i.e.
,
past versus future) and to the relationship between the output
cind the decision-making activity. The former's main purpose is to capture data
about events and to report them retrospectively in a format useful for evalua-
ting performance of the enterprise and its components. The latter 's main pur-
pose is to support anticipatory projections of future performance of the enter-
prise and its components to provide a framework for evaluating proposed decisions,
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Models and Modeling in zhe Decision Process
The research was focused on decision support systems, and more
particularly on computer-based financial planning models, defined as
follows: models comprising data inputs, logic structures and informa-
tion outputs, these outputs being primarily, but not necessarily exclusively,
in the form of accounting or economic identities relating to projected
results; the models being representations of total enterprises, of major
components of an enterprise (e.g., an operating subsidiary, a product or
functional division, a major project or set of projects) , or both - i.e.,
of an enterprise and its disaggregation into major components or vice
versa; and the use of the model being concerned with the improvement of
the decision-making process within the organizations managing the activ™
ities of the modeled entities.
Throughout this paper, the terms "firm," "company," and "enterprise"
are used interchangeably to mean a set of business activities relating
to a specific corporate entity, identifiable, by reference primarily to
a legal framework, from the parties and institutions in the environment
with which the firm transacts business in acquiring input resources and
disposing of its outputs. The environment is not strictly defined,
except by exclusion; that is to say, everything which is not included in
the firm must logically be part of the firm's environment. The tern
"organization" is used to denote a particular characterization of the
employees of the firm, as an information-processing and decision-making
system. Thus, the organization is postulated as a property of the firm,
but is not synonomous with the concept conveyed by the use of the term
"firm." More correctly, the organization is a property of the firm-
environment system, since the organization's information-processing
(and indeed influence) systems must include that part of the environment
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to the firm which is relevant in terms of explaining and predicting the
present and future performance of the firm. In this sense, a strict
analysis of the firm from its environment is probably not of great
practical significance, at least for the present purpose. While the
definition of a financial planning model refers to the modeling of an
enterprise, assuming this to be a central concern in the modeling process,
it was not intended to exclude the possibility of the inclusion of aspects
of the environme.nt in data inputs, logic structures and outputs of a
model. Indeed, the research specifically addressed the extent and manner
in which the environment is included in models.
There are in the literature many approaches to providing a typol-
ogy of financial models (e.g., Grinyer and. Wooller [30], Hammond [37],
TraenJcle, et. al. [38]). A common way is to relate to the structure of
the model itself and to develop a typology based on the main technical
features of its logic. Thus, for example, a distinction is made between
optimizi.ng and simulation models, and between probabilistic cind deterministic
simulations. From an examination of the case studies reported in the
literature of the development of planning models, most appear to adopt.
a
simulation rather them a optimizing approach. There are, however, some
notable exceptions, in particular one reported by Hamilton and Moses [35].
They describe a mixed-integer programming model which uses as an objective
function the maximization of eamings-per-share, and which models all the
main financial variables of the company, including financing, operating and
investment variables, over a multi-period planning horizon. The model has
been implemented by a large, diversified international company, and the
authors report it is used ext!»nsively in the corporate planning process of the
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organization. And in the area of simulation models, preference in practice
,
seems quite firmly to favor a deterministic over a probabilistic approach.
Again, there are exceptions, in particular the case reported by Ishikawa [44].
in which he indicates that corporate managers were uncomfortable with
point-estimate output from a planning model. It is perhaps worth noting that
the model described by Ishikawa was developed for use in an insurance company.
A simple-complex dimension is frequently referred to in classifications
of models. However, the problem with this is to distinguish precisely what
dimensions are being referred to in judging simplicity and complexity. Some
authors infer that a simple modal might be a deterministic simulation, whereas
a more complex model might incorporate probabilistic formulations and/or goa],
structures and optimizing routines. Then again, the degree of data requirement
might be referred to. Some models require little data input since they
incorporate routines for generating additional planning data from the input in
developing the output. From a data input standpoint, these models might be
considered simple, but from the manager's standpoint of having to interpret
the outpuf. and put it to use in the decision process thsy might be considered
just the opposite. This introduces an important consideration which is not
adequately addressed by the simple-complex distinction, namely the cognitive
and psychological impact of the model on the user. Little, in the article
referred to earlier, points out that managers carry responsibility for results,
and therefore if a manager is to have sufficient confidence to make use of a
model its logic must clearly connect to his cognitive understanding, and its
output must be broadly consistent with his intuitive expectations. Through
time, the model can be developed to extend and enhance the manager's decision
calculus, in pace with his growing confidence in the capability of the model
and his control over it.
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Swanson, et. al . [85] emphasize the importance of concentratixig the focus
of a model clearly on a few significant issues, or decisions of salient
iii5>ortance ; therefore, they suggest that complexity should be added to
the Dodel to the extent necessary to deal realistically with the issues
and decision areas it is designed for. The degree of decision focus sug-
gests an important typological dimension. The distinction between a
general information processing and analysis modal relating to the calcxila-
tion and consolidation of plans for the total enterprise, and specialized
decision models taiilored to functional classes of decisions, or to key
elements which are perceived to drive the strategy of an enterprise, is
an importcint and intellectually demanding issue. Carleton, et. al. (11]
describe an approach to modeling a support system for corporate financial
planning and point to the fact that the usual form of model is lonsuited
to this specialized aspect of planning because it typically contains too
much detail, much of which is iirrelevant to the task at hand, it uses
accounting rather than financial language, it is generally deterministic
rather than probabilistic, and because of its size and structure cannot
readily be used in an optimizing mode. Champine [3] , and Hudson et. al.
[43] , in Univac and Xerox respectively, describe specialized modeling
support of their con^euiies* new product planning. The special nature of
the planning problems in these instances would clearly make a total enter-
prise simulation a very unwieldy tool for the purpose. Even so, it has
to be borne in mind that the decisions made with a specialized focus are
not in fact independent of the existing set of operations, or of the
decisions being made in other areas of the organization. Thus, complex
reasoning and judgir.ent are required in order to tiruncate a particular aspect
of the total set of decisions of the organization in a satisfactory way so as
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to be able to concentrate the power of specialized models on this aspect,
and then to effect a re-combination without losing too much in terms of total
system optimality. Simplicity and focus in modeling, in other words, must be
the product of a previous distillation of complexity during the reasoning
which goes into the creation of the model; moreover, simple models must surely
require considerable on-going sophistication on the part of users to translate
model output back into the complexity of the real world of action.
The preceding points suggest that both decision-specialized models and
total enterprise simulators have a potential role to play, and in developing
modeling systems one might expect to find a range of models, linked to the
decision process through the organization's administrative systems. This
approach would contrast with the one adopted at the Sun Oil Company as
described by Gershefski [24] , which appeared to be an extension of the
total, or integrated philosophy of information systems development. It
is however consistent with the general framework suggested by Lorange and
Rockart [55]. They extend Gorry and Scott Morton's framework specifically
in relation lx> pleinning models, and conclude that, because of the diffetent
nature of the decision-making task in different cycles of the planning
and monitoring process and at different levels of the managerial hierarchy,
it does not make sense to expect an integrated model to satisfy all the
various demands, but rather to expect to find a range of loosely-coupled
models, each tailored to specific aspects of the decision process.
RESEARCH RESULTS - GENERAL INTERPRETATIONS
This section presents an analysis of the models and of the modeling
process in the total sample of companies; a closer examination of selected
phenomena in some of the research companies is undertaken in the next section.
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As stated previously, 13 companies were included in the study. Table 2
presents an analysis of the sample in terms of modeling progress and success.
Two companies (Q and R) had considered the development of models but decided
not to proceed. In the other 16 companies 20 models, or modeling systems,
were observed: six were still under development and 14 had already been
developed and implemented. Six of the companies (G,H,I,K,L, and P) had
considerable experience of models, to the extent that the use of models was
widespread and continual in their organizations. In the other companies
single models were being developed or used, with the use largely restricted
to a single staff department, usually the controller's department.
Judgment of success of a model was subjective, based on three factors:
the frequency of model use, whether or not resources were committed to
oaintaining the currency of the model, and the opinions expressed by direct
users of the model. I'Thile this measure of success is not entirely satisfactory,
in that it does not connect directly with a measure of improvement of decision
making, it was nonetheless considered to be relevant, adequate in the context
of the study, and practicable.
Reasons for Not Proceeding with Models
The two cases (Q and R) in which modeling support of the planning
function had been considered, but decided against, displayed quite disparate
reasons for the decision. In the first of these companies, the managerial
style in the organization emphasized a reactive type of control, with
virtxially no concern for a planning, or anticipatory, mode of control; this,
coupled with a secretive, rather than an open, attitude concerning the sharing
27.
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and use of information in the organization, created an adverse climate for
the development and implementation of models. In the second company, financial
planning itself was consciously de-emphasized, so that financial planning models
were not considered an appropriate vehicle for enhancing, or supporting, the
planning process. Both companies were in a relatively quiescent period with
regard to major new strategic initiatives, so that internally-generated
uncertainty was at a relatively low level. And neither company was operating
close to financial efficiency, so that fine-tuning of financing and investment
policies was not an immediate issue to their managements.
Company Q is a medium-sized manufacturer of branded food
products, operating intamationally, and competing on the
strength of some well-known brand names. Its operations are
fairly stable, of ayader^te complexity, and the main uncertainty
stems from volatility in the prices of its material inputs.
While its financial performance has been erratic, it is
protected from pressure from the financial markets because its
shares are privately-held. In the United States the company
is organized functionally, and supplemented by a brand-management
structure. International subsidiaries are relatively autonomous,
self-contained business units. Strong centralized control is
exercised by the chief executive. Formal planning and control
systems are dominated by a twelve-month budget, and by variance
analyses in relation to the budget and to standard costs. Tliis
causes an extremely- reacLive control style, with little concern
for formalized planning. Data processing is centralized, and
operates almost exclusively in a transaction processing, batch
node. The only application of any sophistication is an on-line
sales order entry system; periodically the sales orders file is
used to generate short-term shipping, production scheduling and
purchasing plans. The systems development program is set by a
committee chaired by the chief executive.
After 1973 the operating environment became much more
uncertain than it had previously been. Traditional patterns
of demand and price-volume relationships broke down as consumers
adjusted to higher rates of inflation and riimors about commodity
shortages. For a brief period the need for a greater emphasis
on planning as a basis of control was acknowledged by top
management. A senior analyst was assigned the task of developing
a computer-based planning rcodel as a vehicle to lead this switch
in managerial emphasis. For reasons of his own (which were
probably well-founded in view of the orientation and degree of
expertise of the company's data processing department) he decided
to base the model on a language and operating system available on
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an external time sharing service, incompatible with the company's
data processing facilities, ^^fhen the system was explained to top
management it was immediately vetoed on the grounds that the
necessary data bases and information processing were too sensitive
to be permitted to go outside the company's premises; they could
not be convinced that the security of the proposed time sharing
service was adequate to safeguard confidentiality. No further
attempts have been made to develop a computer-based planning
model, although a proposed project with this objective has been
entered in to the systems development backlog in response to
pressure from middle management. At the time of the research
the project had not been assigned a priority or a timing for
action by the systems development committee.
The reactive management style in the organization makes it unlikely that
progress will be made on the development of planning models in this company
in the near future. This is despite the fact that one of the company's most
immediate competitors is making use of a budgeting and decision support system
on its computer, apparently to good effect. Middle managers strongly advocate
the development of planning and decision support systems: because of their
closer proximity to operational complexities they realize the need for greater
information processing support to enhance their competitiveness. But top
management remain indifferent to this kind of development, and by holding
tight reins on the data processing budget they are able tc .)revent its prigress.
This latter factor is, of course, critical. In other companies where top
management are indifferent to m.odeling support, the activity can nonetheless
flourish, provided some control over data processing resources is delegated
to lower management levels.
The point about security of information in respect to external time
sharing services was not found to be a concern of significance in any of the
other research companies. In fact, in some instances greater concern was
expressed about confidentiality of data internally in the organization!
Company R is a very large international conglomerate, with an
excellent reputation regarding the quality of its management. Its
performance has been good, resulting in a funds-rich situation and
a high level of acceptance by the financial markets of its securities.
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The company is organized into profit and investment-responsible
divisions defined on the basis of type of business. Responsibility
for planning and control methods is delegated to the divisional
level, within a fairly loosely specified set of corporate reporting
requirements. Financial planning is consciously de-emphasized by
corporate management because of their fear that it may obscure the
real essence of planning, namely the underlying reasoning behind
plans to continue, expand or contract a particular business
operation. Reflecting the abundance of funds, no minimum return
requirements are set for investment proposals; on the contrary,
emphasis is placed on encouraging divisional managements to
develop and present investment proposals. Corporate management
distinguish between divisions which are heavily involved in defense
contracting and those which are not. The former they feel have
very little discretion to plan their profitability, whereas the
latter can choose channels of distribution, product range and mix,
pricing and so on, so that they can realistically plan a pro-active
business strategy and evaluate it on the basis of expected
profitability.
Modeling support of the planning and reporting process has
been evaluated by corpcrate management, but it has not been pursued.
In fact, corporate management is considerably skeptical of the
whole idea of modeling. The diversity of operations, with their
very different operating characteristics, makes it in their view
an impossible undertaking to model the enterprise. They concede
that it may be feasible at the level of the individual subsidiary,
but that is a matter left to the discretion of each subsidiary
management.
The lack of sympathy for modeling, and more generally for financial
planning, is interesting in j. company in which one would expect at the
corporate level a primary focus on a financial rationale and framework for
a conceptual integration of the diverse range of operations that the company
is involved in. Other similar companies have given considerable emphasis to
financial planning at the corporate level, working at a highly aggregate data
level in a financial or economic framework. While one can accept that an
emphasis on financial planning might force out of perspective the proper
emphasis on entrepreneurial and business aspects of planning, this is not in
itself a sound argument against financial planning. Two explanations for this
attitude suggest themselves: the experience of many of the conglomerates in
the 1960's and early '70's indicated that their corporate managements had
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insufficient grasp of the business operations of their acquired subsidiaries;
and, in this particular company's case, the perception of corporate management
is that it is more important to encourage entrepreneurial planning to
stimulate investment proposals than to emphasize a form of planning which is
traditionally associated with capital budgeting and conservation of funds.
The Modeling Decision and Subsequent Development
In 12 of the case studies, the origins of the modeling effort could be
traced to a fairly discrete set of circumstances which gave rise to a clear
perception of a need to develop and strengthen the respective organizations'
planning and analytical capabilities. To illustrate:
a new management was brought in to attempt to reverse a long
period of declining market share (D)
;
the company was acquired, and rapidly had to develop the ability
to conform to a new set of planning and reporting procedures (F
and Gl)
;
the top executives recognized that the company's performance
was inadequate, that substantial write-offs of assets had to
be made, and that new business strategies were required (H)
;
industry direction was causing a radical change in investment
patterns - instead of requiring a relatively large number of
investment projects the pattern was changing to one of
relatively few, but large, projects (K and L)
;
mature operations were generating substantially more funds
than their capacity to absorb them through profitable
re-investment (H and J, and, to a lesser extent, G2 and P)
;
a major customer greatly increased the information support
required for bidding and subsequent reporting of contract
progress, thus making this a critical competitive capability
(12 and N)
;
following the 1973 oil price increases and related political
uncertainties, the company's cost functions and investment
returns altered radically (M)
;
and, after many years of above-average growth in sales and
profits, intensifying competition threatened curtailment of
growth and caused a decline in sales margins - additionally,
a significant loss was experienced in one area of operation (P).
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In each of these cases, Che shock of a discrete event, or the recognition,
with relative suddenness, of an accumulation of trends (e.g., the build-up of
surplus funds from mature operations) created a climate within the
organizations in which there was fairly widespread and spontaneous recognition
of the need for substantial change in methods and procedures. This climate
served to override the normal reaction to the uncertainty which is generated
by proposed change, thereby establishing favorable conditions for innovation.
It seems significant that all of the above companies had implemented, or were
in the process of developing, successful modeling support systems; moreover,
all six of the companies which had well-established, widely and continually
used modeling systems were amongst them. A clear, widely-recognized, focus
for the efforts of developing and implementing models appears to emerge as
the single most significant factor in explaining modeling success; a touch
of crisis, it seems, is a powerful catalyst for innovation.
The recognition of the need to strengthen the organization's information
processing capability could be seen to lead to a general set of specifications,
emanatiig usually from l:.ne n.magement. Thj specific decision to use £.
modeling system was derived indirectly from these general specifications,
usually arising within a staff support department. In other words, the
modeling decision was not addressed by line management; their concern was with
information needs, not with the technology of how they should be met.
Subsequently, as staff support improved to meet line requirements, line
managers were encouraged to develop their demands further - for example, in
terms of more rapid provision of reports, greater degrees of analysis, and
additional dimensions by which to view the world. Thus, a positive feedback
dynamic forms between line management and supporting staff; initially line
requirements appear to drive the process, but at some point the cause-and-effeet
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sequence becomes blurred, with staff support at least to some extent pushing
the development of line managers' cognitive structures and abilities to use
more sophisticated analytical methods. This dynamic process is illustrated
in Figure 1.
FIGURS 1 : Dvnamics of the Modeling Process
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From this interpretation of the dynamics of the process it is clear that
the modeling decision is not in fact a discrete, clearly-defined decision at
all. It is, rather, simply part of a wider set of solutions developed in
response to a general problem, which in part concerns the need to upgrade
organizational technology in the area of information processing for planning,
monitoring and analyzing operations. As such, it is not amenable to the kind
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of strict project control which is widely advocated in the literature of data
processing management. The modeling activity not uncommonly defies clear
definition in respect to beginning point, ending point, final product,
resources consumed by it, and benefits derived from it. It is, in fact, only
incidentally a data processing project; data processing is merely an enabling
input to this type of activity. Clearly, therefore, the appropriate control
to apply to it should be external to the data processing department, exercised
in the first instance by direct users, namely staff managers, and ultimately
by indirect users, namely the profit-responsible managers who have to assess
the cost of the service in relation to their perceptions of the benefits
resulting from the use of the information it provides. In virtually every
instance (the exception being company 0) this was in fact the style of
managerial control exercised over the modeling process. But it was also very
clear that the control was almost without exception weakened by a lack of
proper identification of the costs involved, and a lack of visibility, even
of those costs which were identified, to Che managers who were directly
generating the costs, or indirectly responsible in some overall manner for
the profit consequences of the activity.
.\nother point of importance is that line managers are usually involved
in the modeling decision only in an indirect way. They are, to be sure,
interested parties, but seldom are they intimately involved in the development
or use of models in the manner that is often advocated in the literature. It
appears that line management confidence in modeling and the use of model output
is essentially a function of a more general relationship between line and staff
managers in the organization; that is to say, line managers develop confidence
See, for example, Gibson and Nolan [25], especially their characterization
of Stage 3 in the growth of data processing in organizations.
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in the professional competence and understanding of the business of their
staff support people over a period of time and in a variety of circumstances.
While the introduction of models ULay interject a new ingredient to this
relationship, it is nonetheless only an incremental event in the on-going
evolution of the relationship, and line managers' perceptions about the
nature and validity of models are formed in that context. Staff personnel,
if they are sensitive to the balance and importance of this relationship,
should be careful not to jeopardize it by radical innovation in the early
stages of modeling. Over a period of time, however, the change in information
support capability stemming from model usage can contribute to a shift in the
line-staff relationship, towards a closer partnership. In these circumstances,
a vital factor in the maintenance of an effective relationship is a tacit; but
clear perception of role definition amongst the people involved; this point
was stressed by both line and staff managers in several of the organizations
which have a relatively long and successful experience of modeling support. .
An interesting aspect relating to the diffusion of model development and
use in an organization coacerns the location in the li.ie j:ganization wherii
modeling initiates, and the subsequent response elsewhere if that modeling
activity becomes successfully established. The evidence from the research
study on this aspect of the process is drawn only from those companies with
multiple models, and particularly from those within that group with a
relatively clear distinction between corporate and divisional management. In
three of these companies (G, I and P) modeling support of the planning and
reporting function became strongly established in the first instance at the
divisional level. In all three cases, modeling was subsequently developed at
the corporate level. It was only explicitly acknowledged in one of the three
organizations, but an interpretation of this is that the development of models
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to support corporate management was necessary in order to maintain the
balance of power between corporate and divisional management. Just as the
line-staff balance is a crucial one in the effective functioning of an
organization, so too is the corporate-divisional balance. At first
consideration, it may appear that the use of a planning model at the divisional
level would make the assumptions and projections contained in a divisional plan
more visible to corporate managers. However, this does not take into account
the decentralized nature of the process, and in fact experienced observers of
the use of modeling support of the planning process were of the opinion that
a model at the divisional level tends to give divisional management an advantage
in the perennial game of negotiating performance objectives and command over
capital and other resources. The information processing power of the model
allows the construction of a subtle and dispersed biasing of projections
towards support of a particular set of motives, which is difficult to detect
even when countered by a similar information processing and analytical
capability, and almost impossible otherwise. In one organization,, a member
of the corporate planning staff observed that one tenth of one percent annual
improvement in sales margins applied over the planning period of five years
could in one of their divisions amount cumulatively to $50 million in profit
and cash flow„
In two of the companies (H and L) modeling support began at the corporate
level. The divisions, with astonishing alacrity, responded by developing
modeling capabilities of their own. Corporate management can ponder the
development of models at the divisional level before responding, but divisional
managements certainly cannot afford that luxury when the situation is reversed!
To this point we have been discussing companies in which the modeling
activity arose in response to a clear event or set of circumstances which
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necessitated an upgrading of the organization's information processing
capability. But amongst the sample were companies in which modeling had been
introduced successfully, simply as a better way of doing things which were
already being done manually (A and E provided clear examples of this).
Typically, in these cases, modeling is justified in terms of reduction of
computational errors and cost savings (substitution of clerical labor), but
additional factors may also be considered, such as an ability to generate
additional future scenarios and an ability to track performance against plan
at a greater level of detail. The impact of modeling is largely contained
within one department, having little visibility or evidence of change elsewhere
in the organization. However, familiarity with the technology of modeling and
model use is an attendant advantage to these companies, the potential value of
which may not be appreciated until some event precipitates the need for a
significant change in planning methods. Company P, which was included in the
previous set of companies, had for several years used models within its
financial services department to perform the data processing associated with
producing plans, budgets and performance reports. Whar tie circumstances
occurred to cause line management to seek improved planning support, this
department was able to respond very rapidly in providing a modeling system
for use throughout the organization.
Reasons for Failure
The clearest example of a modeling failure was provided by company C,
where the model had been abandoned after about 18 months of use. The reasons
given for discarding it were that it was too costly ($200 - $400 per month to
run), had too slow a turnaround time, and runs were frequently invalidated by
keypunch errors in the input. In fact, however, the model was designed
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inappropriately for its application; it simply did not connect with the
established cognitive structures and planning methods used in the organization. c
The company is a small (sales volume about $40 mi], lion per
year) producer of convenience foods, operating regionally. It
competes with a wide range of national, regional and local
companies - but on Che strength of a well-regarded brand name,
it has a significant: market share in the geographical area in
which it sells its products. Competition is based on a high
volume of promotional activity and product modifications around
the basic product theme. The company is strategically stable,
and its control style is robustly developed in terms of the
competitive requirenents of the industry. Emphasis is on
short-term prediction and responsiveness to prevailing conditions.
Budgeting is done oa a twelve-month rolling projection, updated
monthly; past variances from budget, unless very large, are
typically accorded little attention. Budget and reporting
formats are identical. Budgeting is balanced between line
management and staff siapport people, and follows a bottom-up
logic, beginning in almost the same degree of detail that the
transaction data base builds from. Longer-term planning is not
regarded as being important in the organization, even though
five-year forward projections of financial results are developed
every so often. Corporate managers expressed the wish that they
could get line managers more used to aggregate planning rather
than planning in operational detail, although their reasons for
this were far from clear given the degree of success of the
existing control systems and their fit with the operational
requirements of the competitive conditions of the industry.
Data processing and systems development are centralized
at the company's headquarters. Applications are principally
in the area of operations control, working in a batch node.
Sales orders are entered on-line via tapes which are transmitted
by telephone.
The chief executive of the company attended a seminar on
computer-based planning systems, and decided this approach
should be developed by his organization. The project was
assigned to the budget manager. He selected a commercial
modeling system available on external time sharing. After a
one-week user school, the budget manager, with assistance from
a consultant of the firm which developed the modeling system,
spent two weeks designing the planning model. The model was
based on a financial representation of the total enterprise,
using summary data input developed by the line organization.
A batch mode of running was chosen, using a terminal in the
offices of the consxiiting firm.
The model was never considered to be satisfactory. While
the input requirements in their summary form, appeared to be
modest, the work which the line managers had to go through to
produce the input was in reality considerably burdensome.
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Moreover, the model's logic did noC make available any new
information that was not already being produced by existing
methods; it did not, in other words, enhance the organization's
information generating capabilities. In fact, the output from
the model was first validated by testing its plausibility with
line managers before submission to top management. The
advantage to top management of an automated planning systan,
a greater frequency of re-planning, was achieved at a very high
cost to the line organization, not only in terms of the
additional work to which they were subjected, but also in terms
of the psychological credibility of the model since it relied
ultimately on line managers' judgment for its validity. Even
vrorse, line managers were accustomed to receiving a very
flexible service from the control staff, requesting and
receiving different report formats and analyses as these were
required. Because of the inflexibility of the model, and the
remote terminal, batch mode of use, reliance on the model to
produce output caused the standard of service provided by the
control staff to the line organization to deteriorate. Small
wonder the line organization never warmed to the idea of
computer-based planning models!
The managerial purpose and focus of the model was not adequately defined.
Had it been intended for providing longer-range financial projections to top
management, it would have been preferable to design the model to work from a
centrally-developed data base, and to use a base-year along with regression-
derived equations to relate some of the main financial variables in the model.
'Phis would have allowed the control staff, without causing any burden to
operating managers, to use the model in a flexible way to generate future
scenarios for top management use in strategic planning. But this type of
planning was not in fact much used by top management. If, on the other
hand, the intention had been to provide support to operating management,
then the model v/ould have been better to break into the established planning
logic in the organization at an early stage, that is to say, at a primary
level of logistic detail. This would have required considerably greater
effort in the research and design stage of the model in order to capture
in an explicit way the planning logic in various parts of the organization.
But it would have developed the potential to provide powerful support, firstly
in the area of relieving operating managers of much of the computational
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complexity of planning, and subsequently in the area of analyzing and
njodeling important second-order interdependencies, such as the effect on
other product lines of promoting one particular product line.
The failure in company C presented an interesting comparison with the
success of the modeling effort in G(l).
In many respects G(l) has very similar operations to those
of C. It is a small regional producer of consumer products which
are distributed primarily through supermarkets; growth is being
pursued by means of product-line broadening and geographic
expansion. The company was acquired by a large international
enterprise. Modeling support was introduced in the first instance
to meet reporting requirements specified by the acquiring company.
The same modeling system was chosen as the one used by company C,
Once the reporting application was satisfactorily automated, the
system was e:<tended for use in the preparation of operating plans,
budgets and financial forecasts. The planning module was developed
internally, working on a data base created from line management
input at a primary level of detail. Tne planning logic aggregates
the primary data into departmental operating plans and budgets and
then into a divisional plan and budget. It is a simple system in
concept, but, reflecting faithfully the operating planning and
budgeting style in the organization, it is highly successful. The
annual five-year financial plan, which is also part of the
corporate information structure, is still prepared manually,
following a top-down, summary type of logic.
The planning model was in the process of being refined to
provide a clearer focus for the evaluation of particular
competitive strategies. For example, the effect of "product draw"
was being researched and modeled; when particular products were
being promoted, the effect on the volume of this and other products
was being tracked, and the relationships parameterized for inclusion
in the planning model. Similarly, different distribution strategies
(rack jobbing versus in-store replenishment of product display units)
were also being tracked and modeled. Thus, the model, which began
as a straightforward calculating program, was progressively being
developed in terms of its focus on the kinds of decisions Che
organization was concerned about.
In G(l), at the divisional level, the cost of using the system was
reported to the research team as being about $1,400 per month. However, at
the corporate level, it was ascertained from the general ledger that the
annual cost was in fact over $40,000. This is an interesting observation
about peoples' perceptions of cost and value. The divisional personnel.
The figure of $1400 per month was not, of course, a fabrication. It
was the actual charge of a selected month. But that month was not
representative of a longer-run average.
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perceiving Che system as having high value to them, tended in their minds to
minimize the cost of its use. This is in marked contrast with company C,
where a cost of approximately $300 per month (a fairly trivial amount in a
$40 million company) was viewed with considerable indignation. Where the
perception of value is low (or even negative), any cost is viewed as being
disproportionate - and understandably so.
In both cases, the organizations had relatively little sophistication
in data processing technology. The use of an external modeling system and
time-sharing service overcame that drawback. More importantly, in the case
of G(l), in the aftermath of being acquired the organization received an
infusion of staff personnel from the acquiring organization, personnel who
had experience of sophisticated systems development and implementation.
Therefore, an on-going level of staff expertise was available for successive
and incremental development of the modeling system. In the case of company C,
after an initial short period of model development, the systems expertise, in
the form of a consultant, was withdrawn.
Because of the extensive similarity between these two companies in
terms of their operations and use of the same modeling system, they provide
valuable insight in respect to the anatomy of modeling success and failure.
The salient differences in the two situations, which appeared to the re-
searchers to have bearing on the degree of success or failure of the two
modeling efforts, are summarized in Table 3.
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TABLE 3: Comparison of Factors Contributing to Modeling Success and Failure
Contributing Factor
1. Perceived need for upgrading
infonnation technology
2. Initial application of system
3. Plar.ning logic of the model
Advantages to line management
Uecision-support focus
Cost-benefit perception
On-going systems support
Successful Case
- Widely recognized
Reporting; automation
of established operation
Replication of established
logic in the organization,
from operational detail to
summajry financial data
Relief from computational
burden of planning and
budgeting
Model development
to assist in important
decision and performance
areas
- Relatively high cost as
percent of revenue;
value perceived to
outweigh cost
- Available
Unsuccessful Case
- Not widely
recognized
- Planning
- Top-down logic;
different from
established loc
in the organiza-
tion
- None; negative
None ; no
enhancement of
organization's
cognitive capa-
bility
Low cost as perce
of revenue; but
perceived as high
in relation to vs
Withdrawn after '
initial devel-
opment
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In company B the same aodeling system was being used as in C and G(l).
At the time of the research the model was still in the process of development,
but the signs of failure were abundantly in evidence. Despite some initial
external support, the internal competence was not available to sustain a
successful modeling effort. More importantly, however, the political context
in which the model was being developed seemed likely to be a deciding factor
against it.
The company is a very large, international producer,
processor and distributor of foodstuffs. A diversification
program has been started, but sales and profits are still
dominated by the traditional product lines. These operations
are mature, and the company is generating a surplus of funds.
The organization is structured into profit-responsible divisions,
defined on the basis of product lines. Because of a significant
volume of inter-divisional transfer of product, however, a high
degree of coordinating direction is exercised by corporate
management. There is very little established philosophy
concerning planning and control in the organization.
Traditionally, planning has come under the Financial Vice
President, and this function is dominated by short-range
(12 month) financial planning, managed by the Assistant
Treasurer. Recently, a Vice President - Corporate Planning
was appointed to be responsible to the President for five-year
planning. Shortly after the appointment of the new planning
executive, the development of the planning model was initiated
within the treasury department. The new head of corporate
planning spoke to the researchers about the use of models in
the planning function in disparaging terms, particularly
stressing the inability of models to deal with uncertainty.
The five-year planning is conducted annually, is almost
entirely a verbal exercise with no financial structure, and is
largely a line management function with a minimum of staff
support. Short-range planning, in contrast, is conducted
monthly, is predominantly financial in nature, and is a staff
function with a minimum of line management input. Planning,
as a formal function, is contained within the top levels of
management, and is not regarded as being of great importance.
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A few years ago the Controller decided to automate the
accounting consolidation procedures. Several available
packages were examined, and one chosen on the basis of its
suitability for the job, the speed with which it could be
brought on line, and the expected cost. The application is
considered a success, although the cost has far exceeded prior
estiiTiates. Whereas previously corporate financial accounts
were prepared twice a year, they are now prepared monthly, and
with a much greater degree of supporting analysis. Subsequently
it was decided to develop the companion package of the reporting
system, the financial planning model. One of the company's
divisions was selected to be modeled as a first step. A member
of the corporate treasury staff and the assistant to the
Divisional Controller were appointed to develop the model.
The main purpose of the model was defined to be the development
of cash flow forecasts, and an analysis of the sensitivity of
cash flows and profits to movements in the commodity prices of
the division's material inputs. The model is a bottom-up,
deterministic simulation, used in batch mode, and working on
a twelve-month forecasting period. The model took four months
to develop; most of the technical support came from an external
consultant on the staff of the firm which developed the modeling
system. At the time of the research, the model had not yet been
used in earnest; however, delays in its development, a lack of
internal expertise in modeling, and inadequate support from the
system documentation and consulting back-up, had already
contributed to widespread skepticism about its potential
effectiveness. The claim was made that by the time all the
required input data had been prepared the output was already
known by the users; they felt they could anticipate the model,
and that it was therefore not extending their information
generating and analytical capabilities. Curiously enough,
corporate managers were expecting that the model would
ultimately be useful for producing forecasts of sources and
uses of funds; but the divisional model was being developed to
provide cash flow forecasts.
The final case in which the modeling effort was considered to be failing
concerned a model which had been highly successful, and indeed was one of the
cost sophisticated amongst those examined in the research study. It was
developed in the early 1970' s by company 0, a wholly-owned subsidiary of a
large corporation.
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Company is a producer of a range of basic chemicals
which are used as input to a variety of industrial processes;
the company is a dominant supplier of these chemicals, and has
a number of long-term sales contracts to supply a small number
of major users.
The planning model was developed by an external consultant,
working with an internal team of analysts, and with the
enthusiastic support of the divisional chief executive. The
model simulates the physical operations of the company, and also
produces accounting representations of these; economic analyses
can be called on as sub-routines, for example, the use of
discounting methods for ranking proposed investment programs.
It is a deterministic simulation, programmed in DYNAMO with some
FORTRAN sub-routines, has tabular and graphic output capability,
works in a batch mode, and operates on a five-year planning
horizon broken down into 60 monthly periods. The model is a
"middle-range" type of decision support device, assisting with
both strategic and tactical decisions, but within the structure
of a well-established business which faces relatively low levels
of uncertainty. It is used for the periodic development of
five-year plans and planning updates; in addition, it is used
for specific decision-support activities such as the negotiation
of prices for long-term sales contracts, capacity expansion
decisions, and decisions about the mi:< of feedstock in relation
to capacity and output requirements.
The model fell victim in the first instance to an austerity drive
initiated by corporate management as a reaction to losses sustained in the
1974-75 recession. Instructions were issued that staff were to be reduced.
At the same time, turnover in the division's staff had taken away people
familiar with the model, so that eventually there was nobody left who could
easily maintain it along with other duties. As a result, even though the
divisional general manager still believed in the value of the model, it was
steadily becoming obsolete and falling into disuse.
The Internal-External Dimension
The research was designed to explore the question of whether the degree
of modeling success was influenced by the use of an externally-developed
system as a basis for the modeling, and whether, in addition, the use of
external time sharing had any influence on success.
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Seven organizations in the research sample (A through Gl) were using the
same nodeling system, a system which is made available exclusively through one
of the major time sharing services. The system is designed to produce reports
and analyses, working from a company's transaction data bases and summary data
files; it also has a planning module, feeding into the same report generators
in producing the planning output. The planning module has several partitions,
so that a number of aspects of the business can be modeled; alternatively, or
additionally, the enterprise can be modeled in different degrees of aggregation
so that the planner can move back and forth between, for example, shorter and
longer-terra representations. The planning model is developed by the organization
using it. The system itself simply provides the modeling language, the data
management system, the control of data transfer from one file to another, and
the user interface system. It is robust and relatively flexible. However, it
is written in an accounting format. As a result, it has the strengths inherent
in the accounting discipline - for example, control checks on the internal
consistency of data - and the weakness that the user requires accounting
knowledge to he fully conversant with the system's use and format - for example,
every data entry requires a debit and a credit instruction. Not surprisingly,
therefore, in all but one instance the system was being used by the accounting
or the controller's department. And in all instances it was being used solely
to generate twelve-month budgets, even when a longer-term plan was part of the
organization's information structure. In no case was the system being used
anywhere close to its full potential; in fact, users were generally not aware
of the full range of the systems' features and capabilities, a fault which
reflects on the user support provided by the time sharing service, including
the inadequacy of system documentation manuals.
Three organizations (HI, H2, and 13) in the sample were using
externally-developed systems on internal time sharing. All of these are
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large organizations with extensive data processing and systems development
resources available internally. Nevertheless, they had chosen to base their
modeling support on a comip.ercially-available system. This approach allows an
organization to get a modeling support capability up and working faster than
by following in-house development, but more importantly it allows internal
staff to concentrate on the organizational aspects of modeling and model
introduction rather than worrying about possible defects in, for example, the
control software of the system. In the case of company H, modeling support
had been initiated within the corporate planning department, firstly to support
the executive committee in a strategic reappraisal of the company's rate and
mix of investment and performance, and subsequently to support top managements'
evaluation of plans submitted by the divisions. The initial modeling was
programmed in BASIC. Shortly after the round of divisional planning reviews
during which divisional managements were first exposed to the fact that
corporate management were using modeling support, the management science
department received top-priority requests from every one of the company's
divisions for the development of divisional planning models. To respond to
this as rapidly as possible a coiratierically-available modeling system was
selected as a basis for the work, and the corporate modeling systems were
re-written so as to be compatible with the divisional models. Curiously
enough, however, the management science staff were very defensive about this;
it took some considerable probing by the researchers before the fact emerged
that a commercial system was being used. The staff apparently felt that the
use of an externally developed system reflected unfavorably on their
professional competence.
Table 4 is extracted from Table 2 , and shows degree of success
related to the external-internal dimension.
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TABLE 4: .Modeling Success Ralatad zo Internal-Extarnal Dimension
System Development
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consulting assistance generally was concerned with initial model development,
paying little attention to trying to anticipate subsequent modification and
extension of the model and preparing user personnel to deal with these.
Without continual development as understanding of the potential of the use of
models increases, the danger exists that the modeling system will gradually
deteriorate to the status of a high-speed calculator and printer rather than
an extension of and enhancement to the cognitive capabilities of the organization.
Of course, it is not at all obvious the extent to which a time sharing service
can provide the kind of on-going consulting support that is implied by this
criticism; however, at least some effort could readily be applied to the
correction of the deficiency by, for example, preparing a much fuller
description of the capabilities of the modeling system, along with case study
examples of their use exploring implementation issues as well as technical and
analytical aspects.
The conclusion that the external-internal dimension is not a significant
factor in explaining the degree of modeling success is more strongly supported
by looking at the research data the other way round. Two (E and Gl) of the
seven organizations using the external system on external time sharing were
doing so with very high degrees of success; and txTO others (D and F) , even
though their planning models were still under development, were displaying the
kind of enthusiasm and clarity of direction of the development effort that
suggested they would eventually be highly successful. And the two companies
(H and I) using externally-developed systems on internal time sharing were also
exhibiting fairly high degrees of success. These cases demonstrate that it is
quite feasible to use external systems equally as successfully as internally-
developed systems. Furthermore, the use of an external system has attendant
advantages in the areas of speed of modeling development, robustness of the
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operating software, and the extension of experience from other organizations,
through the design of the system, into one's own organization. Companies
considering the initial development of a modeling effort, therefore, should
give careful consideration to using an externally-developed system; furthermore,
as will be discussed in a moment, they should also consider the use of an
external time sharing service, even when the computer capacity is available
internally.
Most of the companies successfully using the external system on external
time sharing began the process by automating their reporting and analysis
functions, and subsequently extended the use of the system into the planning
area. An example of this (Gl) was described in the previous section, and
another (F) x^ill be described here. This case closely parallels the sequence
and nature of the development followed in company D.
Company F is a medium-sized producer of a basic food
product, operating internationally and pursuing a growth
strategy by means of a step-by-step expansion into additional
foreign countries. The modeling system was first used several
years ago for the consolidation and analysis of financial
reports. One of the main complexities the company's management
was interested in capturing in the modeling system logic was
the effect of foreign taxes and currencies on the consolidated
cash flows and profits of the enterprise. The calculating
logic of this was developed cooperatively with a number of
other companies with a similar range of domestic and foreign
operations. As well as performing the consolidation of
financial reports, the package provides a powerful analytical
capability for comparing current results with previous results
on a number of dimensions, in both US dollars and in foreign
currency. Work is now proceeding to extend the use of the
package into the planning process. This is expected to be
relatively straightfonward
,
given the experience already
attained from the use of the package in the reporting mode.
The planning model is expected to provide savings in clerical
effort, and also to allow fine-tuning of plans and policies
through, for example, analysis of the timing of investment
programs and the examination of cash flow consequences of
different inventory policies and customer credit terms.
In the modeling system being developed by company D, many of the same
features are incorporated as in the case of company F. An additional matter
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of concern to the modeler in company D v;as the inflexibility of the planning
system to handle the analysis of a number of mutually-exclusive alternatives
within the same model run. For example, in preparing plans, he wanted to be
able to test the effect of altering the portfolio of investment projects
included in the plan. He developed a program allowing him to interrupt the
model run at the appropriate point, resort to an analytical sub-routine to
show the effect on a few key suirmary performance variables of modifying the portfolio o:
investment projects in specified ^vTays, and then to proceed with the full model
run when a selection has finally been made. A common criticism of external
modeling systems is their lack of flexibility to deal with the precise
situation and planning logic used by a particular organization; while the
criticism is valid, this example shows that the flexibility of the system can
be enhanced by some ingenious programming development, provided the user is
fully-versed in the coding and structure of the system he is dealing with.
The quality of the time sharing service appeared to be a critical factor
in enabling the establishment of a successful modeling effort, especially a
modeling effort which is widely based within the organization as comojred 'riLth
one where the use of a model is largely restricted to one person or to one
department. The reason for this is perhaps not immediately obvious. Line
managers typically do not make major decisions on the spot in response to new
information; rather, they will usually allow a gestation period during which
they are mentailly sifting through the evidence, exploring their intuitive
impressions and feelings about the situation, and engaging in informal discussion
with colleagues and with others whose judgment and experience they respect.
Therefore, a rapid turnaround time between model runs would not seem to arise
as a direct function of the line management decision process. The reason for
this apparent inconsistency lies in the fact that line managers are not, by and
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large, the direct users of modeling systems; staff support personnel are
usually the direct users. Their work schedules are keyed off a line management
schedule, and amplified by a natural desire to be prepared, in their briefing
of line management, not only to explain a particular set of selected output
from a model, but also to respond to a whole range of potential questions which
are likely to, or even just might, arise. Staff personnel will generally try
to second-guess line management, at least in their preparation if not in their
style of presentation. Consequently, a vastly greater amount of analysis is
often done than ever surfaces overtly in the line management decision process.
Processing schedules, therefore, are usually tight, especially at certain times
of the year when the annual planning and budgeting procedures are in progress.
Moreover, an interactive mode of use of a model may be more efficient in human
terms than an off-line or batch mode of use, because it allows immediate
exploration of ideas as they occur to the analyst. These forces tend to push
a system towards an on-line, interactive mode of use, even though one might
appropriately question the cost-effectiveness of this for many applications,
or for particular processing and printing operations within the analysis and
1
output preparation sequence.
Companies G and P provided interesting insight to the question of the
quality of the computer service provided to the organization. Both had
initially relied on external time sharing services to meet their requirements
in the area of modeling and decision-support applications, but had subsequently
developed internal services. This latter development was in response to a
recognition by top management of the large and rapidly-growing fees being paid
for external tLme sharing (reaching, in the case of company G, approximately
$500,000 per year at its peak), while the budget for internal data processing
was at the same time growing. In company P a top management directive was
1. These comments relate to the earlier point concerning a lack o£ identification or
visibility of costs of model development and use to direct and indirect users,
thereby wea.kening the mcinagerial co.ntrol of the process.
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issued to the operating units to switch their use from external to internal
sources; but this merely had the effect of causing external time sharing fees
to be obscured from sight by distributing then amongst several overhead
accounts. It was not until the internal data processing organization gave
priority to the development of an adequate time sharing service that users
switched from external sources. The orientation of many data processing
departments has in the past, and indeed often continues to be dominated
by large transaction processing applications, an environment in which time
sharing, decision-support applications have difficulty in securing adequate
priority and attention. This orientation shows itself in such things as an
adherence to machine-efficient programming languages, priorities in the
development of schedules for computer time, and the skills of the associated
systems development and programming staff. To break out of this orientation,
in company C a separate data processing organization was formed to provide
internal time sharing, with its own computer and systems staff, and headed by
a manager hired from one of the major time sharing services. This department
was set up as a profit center, and was in addition judged ju the basis of how
rapidly it was able to convert users from external to internal sources. Users
were not required by top management directive to shift to the infernal service;
they were only expected to prefer it when service and price were comparable to
those available externally. Within two years all major external applications,
with the one remaining exception of the modeling application described in G(l),
had been converted to internal time sharing.
In summary, while the research data appeared to indicate a lower degree
of success accruing to modeling efforts based on external systems used on
external time sharing, on closer examination it was concluded that causality
could not be attributed to this factor. Other differences appeared to be much
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more plausible in explaining the lower degree of success - in particular,
relatively less developed planning and reporting procedures, shorter periods
of experience with modeling and model use, and generally lower levels of
expertise in using data processing as a resource to support decision making
and control. In fact, from an examination of specific cases, the use of an
externally-developed modeling system could be seen to have significant
advantages, especially in the earlier stages of introducing modeling. Moreover,
the use of an external time sharing service could also be seen to have
significant advantages, at least until an internal capability, with adequate
emphasis on satisfying user requirements, is developed; when this occurs the
choice can be made simply on the basis of relative cost and capacity
availability, the familiar make-or-buy type of decision.
Information Structures in Models
In the modeling literature it is often unclear exactly what is the
subject of a model, and what form of modeling representation is being used.
In this sub-section, the information structures of the models in the research
sample are analyzed. Table 5 presents a suirjuary analysis of the infon?.ation
structures in the 20 models observed.
Within a total information structure for managing the decision process,
at a primary level of analysis one can distinguish between the organization,
as an information processing and decision making system, and the enterprise-
environment system to which the organization relates and which is the subject
of the organization's concern and attention. Clearly, such an analysis is
dealing with different characterizations of the same set of physical phenomena.
For example, the enterprise as a conceptual entity must inevitably include the
members of the organization, as components of the work-flow system in a
logistics representation and as elements of the cost structure in an economic
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TABLE 5: Suirmarv Analvsis of Information Str^actures in Models
ENTERPRISE MODELING
LOGISTICS REPRESENTATION VALUE REPRESENTATION
Physical Quantities
and Relationships
Monetary System
(Cash Flow)
Accounting Framework
Balance
Sheet
Income
Statement
Funds
Flow
Economic
Framework
45%
(8 cos.)
70%
(13 COS.)
65%
(13 COS.)
90%
(15 COS.)
15%
(3 COS.)
35%
(6 COS.)
ANALYSIS OF ENTERPRISE:
Total Enterprise 75% (13 COS.)
Strategy Centers 10% ( 2 COS.)
Businesses 35% ( 7 COS.)
Markets 10% ( 2 COS.)
Product Lines 60% (10 cos.)
Programs/Pro j ects 35% ( 6 cos.)
Business Functions 50% ( 9 cos.)
TIME STRUCTURE
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representation; and when dealing with the concept of the organization the
members are again centrally part of the representation, but in this instance
characterized, for example, in terms of their roles as part of an information-
processing and decision-making network.
From the data in Table 5 it can be seen that the models in the research
sample are predominantly and primarily models of the enterprise or of parts of
the enterprise. In only ten of the m.odels is the organization included as part
of the infoncation structure. In some instances the inclusion of the
organization is incidental, since an analysis of the enterprise into its major
components (e.g., divisions) happens also to coincide with the responsibility
structure of the managerial organization. Another way in which the organi'zation
structure is included indirectly within the modeling system, particularly in
the case of large, single-business (or dominated) companies, is to have the
same modeling system work on data bases which are differentiated by
responsibility center; thus, even though the model's logic is independent of
the organization structure, the output from the use of the system is
differentiated by responsiblity center. The advantage, of th.is type of
arrangement is that the model does not have to be revised when the organization
structure is changed; only the data bases which are affected have to be re-cast.
And, since organization structure, particularly at lower levels of the managerial
organization, is subject to frequent change, a model based on the organization
structure would inevitably be out of date much of the time.
Only two models include environmental variables in their structures. In
both instances, this is not truly a modeling of the environment in a formal
sense. In the case of company I, at the corporate level within the strategic
planning department, an analytical study is under development to attempt to
understand the main variables in the environment which appear to influence
the perfonnance of each of the company's strategic business units. The system
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supporting che analysis interfaces with the DRI data base, has an internal
data base of key performance statistics from the company's divisions, and
can call on a number of data analysis programs to allow the planners to test
hypotheses about the effect of the environment on the performance of each <
division. The intent is to develop greater insight to the impact of the
environment on the businesses to provide a basis for long-term forecasting
of performance and setting of the strategic direction of the company. And
in the case of company P, the modeling system can interface with the Chase
Commodity Prices data base. The modeling system allows projected product
mixes to be translated into material input quantities, and costed out by
applying expected prices of commodities. This information is used to support
product mix, pricing, and product design decisions.
Two basic forms can be used to represent the enterprise: a logistics
form, and a value representation of the logistics system. The logistic system
has dual aspects; a physical resource system and an associated monetary
system, each of which has to be modeled and captured by the organization's
data proc essi.ii, system. Mori;07er, the calculating logic to translate between
the physical and the monetary systems is a key managerial capability in
explaining how the two interact with one another as a basis for predicting
and managing their future behavior. The value representation of the logistics
system can be derived by the use of two distinct calculating logics: an
accounting logic and an economic logic.
The logistics representation of the enterprise is a central one in that
it provides information in the form which is closest to the organization's
realm of action in the real world, and is fundamentally concerned with
feasibility, viability, and ensuring that the correct things get done in a
timely maimer (Hax[40]). Managerial decision making, however, requires a modeling of
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the enterprise in terms of value in order to go beyond questions of feasibility
and to develop criteria for ordering preferences amongst sets of feasible, but
mutually exclusive, courses of action. The accounting framework for measuring
and recording value is not discretionary, since it is required for reporting
to external parties. The economic framework, however, is discretionary and,
since it uses a different basis from the accounting framework for translating
from cash flows to value, it can potentially give different results in terras
of derived decision criteria and choices stemjning from their use. Normative
theory suggests the superiority of the economic framework over the accounting
framework for decision making, because it connects more directly with the idea
of maximizing shareholder wealth. It was of interest, therefore, to observe
the extent to which planning models incorporate an economic, as distinct from
an accounting, logic.
The data in Table 5 show that only 45% of the models in the study include
in their information structures a representation of physical quantities and
relationships. In all of these cases the models are from organizations managing
a single-business, or a dominated enterprise. In such situations it is not
uncommon for top management to be involved \rLth managerial problems concerning
logistics aspects of the business. In more diverse companies, however, modeling,
as might be expected, tends to be addressed exclusively in financial terms. The
inclusion of cash flows in the information structures of models has a higher
frequency of incidence than might be expected, since a cash flow structure is
not central to the accounting framework. The explanation for this is two-fold:
on the one hand, almost half the models are short-term (one year) in their time
orientation, and a cash flow framework is more useful than a funds flow framework
for shorter-term monitoring and control; and on the other hand, two of the models
are based on cash-flow projections, operating on these to produce accounting and
economic representations of plans.
59.
The dominant form of representing the enterprise is by the: use of
accounting identities. The income statement is used in all but two of the
models. One of these only represents projects in the form of physical plans
and cash expenditures; the revenues associated with projects are not included
in the model. And the other works entirely in a net present value framework,
without translating this into a conventional accounting income statement.
The balance sheet is not as commonly included as might be expected, but it has
to be borne in mind that eight (40%) of the models relate to subsidiaries or
divisions rather th^n to independent companies, so that a balance sheet is not
necessarily relevant in all cases. The very low incidence of a funds flow
format in modeling structures is, however, a striking feature of the data.
Particularly for longer-term financial planning at the total enterprise level,
the funds flow structure recommends itself, since it combines within one
framework all the financial aspects of the enterprise. This low frequency,
however, is consistent with the concentration in the use of models on planning
and decision making in the area of investment and operations, to the exclusion
of application to planning the finances of the enterprise, a point which is
addressed in t±ie next, section.
Seven of the models include analytical routines derived from an economic
framework. In all but two instances, however, these are fairly minor in their
impact, entailing for example discounting sub-routines for the analysis and
selection of investment projects. The two cases in which the economic
framework is a central feature of the information structure of the model are
discussed in detail as a specific topic in the next section.
The data on time structure shows that the models divide almost equally
into short-term (one year) and longer-term planning models. The "variable"
category denotes models where the planning horizon is selected as a function
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of the particular project or program being planned for, and is usually more
than one year and less than ten years.
The data on modeling features shows that the models are generally not
sophisticated in a formal management science sense. Most, in fact, are
relatively straightfonward, deterministic simulation models. The probabilistic
and optimizing formulations are in all instances incorporated as sub-routines
in the models, rather than being dominant in the modeling logic.
From this general analysis of the information structures of models, a
pattern strongly suggests itself, which is summarized in Figure 2.
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Modeling support is predominantly applied to a simulation of the enterprise.
In about half the cases, this is extended, either directly in the logic of the
model or indirectly through the differentiation of data bases, to an analysis
of the enterprise in relation to the responsibility structure of the managerial
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organization. Interpretation of the environment is handled by the organization,
and in most cases forecasts of ^ for example, demand and sales volume are
developed within the organization independently of the modeling system. Model
structures are generally unsophisticated in the sense that they do not
incorporate formal decision-science techniques for the analysis of risk or for
arriving at an optimal set of decisions; on the contrary, they are mainly of the
deterministic simulation type, supportive of management rather than assertive in
the decision implications of their output. But many of the models are
nevertheless quite complex in terms of their data input requirements and
calciilational capability. Viewing the enterprise as the collectivity of tasks
in which the organization is engaged, characterized principally by complexity,
models can be viewed as dealing with the complexity aspect of the information-
processing and decision-making task, leaving managers to deal with external
uncertainty arising in the environment and internal uncertainty in respect to
the subtleties and politics of tradeoffs amongst multiple goal dimensions and
the resolution of conflict between sectionalized interests. This division of
labor between models and managers does not appear to emerge by default, but
stems from a conscious judgment concerning the difficulty, and indeed
inefficiency, of attempting to elaborate more technically sophisticated model
formulations. Instead, effort is directed towards designing sophistication
into the way models, and information output from models, are used in the
organization, in a continual attempt to develop increasingly robust solutions
to the joint and related problems of dealing satisfactorily with uncertainty
and with goal direction on a multiplicity of dimensions. This topic is
discussed in more detail later in the paper.
Model Developnent and Applications
A summary analysis of aspects of the development and use of the 20
modeling systems is presented in Table 6.
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TABL2 6: Suirmars'' .Analysis of Development and Use of Models
NUMBER Ai\T) LINKAGE OF MODELS
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In the majority of the cases examined (60%), single models were being
used. In some instances, these models are supplemented by analytical routines
geared to a particular type of decision of importance to the organization, for
example a "lease versus purchase" type of analysis. This use of a supplementary
routine may be an emerging step towards the development of multiple models,
where the main model is supported by one or more satellite models, formally
developed and designed to support coramonly-made, and important, types of
decision. In six (30%) of the cases multiple models were in use, these models
being independent of one another in their structures and data bases. In two
cases (10%) multiple, linked models were being used. The linkage in both
instances was in the form of common data bases, or automatic data transfer
between data oases, rather than in the modeling logics themselves.
In terms of decision implications of the models observed, 70% were
judged to be indirect in terms of their specific connection to the decision-
making process; however, 35% were also perceived to be in transition, moving
into the "direct-supportive" category, and these are included in the 65% shown
in that box of the table. Only one modeling system (II) was considered to be
"direct-assertive" in its decision implications. This refers to a modeling
system used in a well-established business, characterized by low uncertainty
but high technical and logistics complexity; the modeling system impacts
directly on the logistics control of the enterprise.
A fairly clear pattern of development can be traced in the evolution of
the modeling systems in the research companies; this is depicted in Figure 3.
By far the majority of the modeling systems appear to begin as general
information processing types of model, only indirectly impacting on the
organization's decision-making process. At this stage, the modeling effort
is usually contained within one department. Subsequently, the modeling system
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may be used as a focus for learning about the behavior of the enterprise, so
that additional relationships may be captured in the modeling logic;
alternatively, as previously described, some specific set of events may
precipitate both wider-spread use of the modeling system and the development
of the model to focus on the salient types of decision which are perceived to
65.
be central to the organization's business strategy. At the same time, one can
observe in some cases the development of specific, decision- focused models,
designed to support particular categories of important decisions; for example,
product strategy, capital investment, or financing decisions. At this stage,
the modeling system is clearly shifting to a direct-supportive mode. A final
stage of development, one which a few of the research companies were beginning
to enter, entails an emerging concern for greater integration of multiple
models, firstly from the standpoint of ensuring consistency in data and
parameter definitions, and then technically in terms of linking through
automatic data transfer; at the same time, attempts may be made to ensure a
degree of uniformity of modeling and model usage throughout the organization,
for example, extending the use of models developed domestically into foreign
managerial units.
One organization (II) in the research sample had approached the modeling
process from an entirely different beginning point, following a bottom-up
philosophy. It provides an interesting study, because of the contrast it
presents in modeling approach to another division of the coTpany (12) , of V3ry
similar size and operating characteristics. Both divisions have successfully
functioning modeling systems.
The divisions are both large (sales of several hundreds
of millions of dollars), strategically-stable, manufacturers
of high-technology, high-unit-value products. They compete
against a small number of companies, their businesses are
highly dependent on government contracts, mainly DOD, and they
also sell to commercial customers. The main uncertainty faced
by them stem from contract bidding - whether or not they will
receive a major contract, and subsequent re-scheduling of major
contracts once secured. Considering both are divisions of one
company, working within the same corporate authority system and
procedures, one might expect the same modeling approach to
emerge in each. But in fact the approaches in each were
entirely different, although they could both be seen eventually
to be converging to the same end state.
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In 1(1) modeling support began about ten years ago,
concentrating on the development of solutions to specific,
commonly-encountered problems. The modeling effort was
supported by the systems development group within data
processing, which in turn is part of the controller's
department. Initiative for developing new models stems
almost entirely from within the systems development group,
and the main users are within the control function. Top
management are almost entirely isolated from the modeling
activity, depending on the controller for provision of
their infomiation requirements.
Unification of the modeling activity is now being
approached through the development of an integrated data
base. Data is classified into three main categories on the
basis of the degree of aggregation, and automatic data
transfer occurs between the data bases following a prescribed
sequential aggregation from elementary data. Forecasting
routines develop planning data bases from transaction data
bases, and a variety of applications programs, in turn,
operate from these planning data bases.
Systems are categorized into: OPERATING SYSTEMS,
working on elementary data and supporting applications such
as production scheduling and control, purchasing and payroll;
PLANNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, working on intermediate data,
and supporting the policy analysis required for parameterizing
the operating systems - for example, a Monte Carlo simulation
model is used to examine the investment consequences of
different inventory policies; and TOPDOWN SYSTE-IS, working
on aggregated data, using a product as the unit of analysis,
and focusing on a modeling of individual product programs.
No overall simulation of the division has been developed as yet.
The structure of I(l)'s modeling system is illustrated in
Figure 4
.
In 1(2) the modeling philosophy follows a top-down approach,
and is driven very directly by managements' interests and
requirements. Some time in the past an unsuccessful effort was
made to form a management science group in the division.
Subsequent to that, a one-man nucleus was established to
introduce modeling support. His first model was a simple
accounting-based program; however, it was successful, and paved
the way for more ambitious modeling.' Several internal seminars
were run on modeling and its application to managerial problems.
From these, requests for modeling support arose from all over
the organization. A wide range of modeling is now in use, but
the basic philosophy is top-down in nature, with models geared
to top management concerns. A central model, simulating the
total division and working on a ten-year planning horizon,
provides both a managerial and a modeling focus.
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The central model is constructed around product-programs
as the first unit of analysis. Products are disaggregated
into parts and components, grouped on the basis of learning-
curve coefficients. This allows product programs to be
simulated on the basis of different assumptions about
production and delivery rates, and length of program. The
form of analysis is thus keyed to one of the most important
sources of uncertainty to the organization, namely success
of contract bidding and subsequent re-scheduling of contracts
once in progress. The learning-curve algorithm was chosen
because it is required by one of the division's main customers,
the DOD. The product-program structure also connects directly
with the managerial responsibility structure in the organization.
An aggregating routine allows a divisional simulation to
be produced, with output in the form of revenues, direct expenses,
program overheads, and manpower, facility and material requirements.
The anticipated demands arising on resources can then be compared
with available resources as information input to manpower and
facility plans.
The central model is written in FORTRAN, and implemented
on TSO on the division's IBM 370-158. Other financial modeling
uses a variety of languages and modeling systems, for example
BASIC, FORTRAN, PSG and SPEAKEASY.
On-line terminals are used, with displays projected on a
large screen, to support monthly management meetings, and special
meetings to address issues as they arise.
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The cases of 1(1) and 1(2) provide an interesting contrast in Tnodeling
approaches. Each, working within the same corporate system, and involved in
similar sets of operations, has developed quite different, but successful,
modeling systems. The explanatory variable would appear to be the difference
in managerial style in the two organizations. Thus, while successful modeling
efforts appear to follow a predominant pattern, it has to be borne in mind
that other approaches can still be adopted and result in successful developments.
The data in Table 6 on development and direct use of models show the
dominance of control and planning staff. Management science staff are less
involved in this type of modeling, being generally more expert in, and
interested in, the decision-specialized types of model. Between planning and
control staff a difference in approach can also be observed. Control staff
tend to be more comfortable working with models which bear a very direct
resemblance to the accounting-dominated budgeting and reporting structure
with V7hich they normally work. Planning staff, on the other hand, are
generally more flexible in the information and analytical structures which
they use. A very direct example of this was provided by company L.
The company was faced with a marked change in its investment
patterns, moving towards a smaller number of much larger projects
than previously. The chief executive requested a development of
the planning and analysis procedures supporting investment decision
making. Initially, the controller's department undertook a
project to develop a modeling system for this purpose. After
some months it became clear that they were developing a budget-type
of model. The chief executive ordered a halt to the effort, and
requested that the corporate planning department should address
the problem. The planning staff developed a system which works
on investment projects as the primary unit of analysis, provides
the capability for analyzing the cash flows of projects in net
present value terms, selecting projects on the basis of
maximization of net present value subject to defined constraints
such as the level and timing of expenditure, and printing out a
selected investment program in terms of each project and the
consolidated profile of the total set of projects. Accounting
variables are not used in the modeling system, and the system is
only applied to the management of strategic investment, not to
the total set of operations of the com.pany. The system is direct.
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straightforward, and focuses precisely on the particular issues
of managerial concern. It was developed and implemented by the
planning staff, using BASIC as a programming language.
Subsequently, the system was revised by the data processing
people and rewritten in FORTRA^I to make it more efficient from
a data processing standpoint, but without changing the
characteristics from the users' standpoint.
The data on application aceas show the wide range of applications
encountered in the research sample. The fit between the type of model and
application area is discussed in the section on typology. At this point,
however, one aspect of the range of applications is worth noting, namely the
very low incidence of the use of models in the financial strategy area. One
reason for this is the mix of the models in the sample, with half of them
being of the short-term, budgeting support type. As pointed out by Carleton, et. al.
[11], this type of model is unsuited for use in the area of financial strategy.
However, even amongst the companies with a variety of models applied to
various areas, there was a distinct and explicit tendency not to address the
finance (or treasury) function in the development of models. In two of these
organizations the point was made explicitly by modeling staff that their
assistance had been acti.vely resisted by thuir financial management people.
In Figure 5, the managerial function is expressed in financial terms,
and the incidence of modeling applications related to it.
The percentages in Figure 5 refer to the general area of application of
the 20 modeling systems. It can be seen that the predominant application
areas are on the operating side of the managerial system. In many instances,
information from the models used in the operating side may also be used in
the management of short-term financial resources; for example, a cash-flow
forecast may be derived from a budget of operations, and used in the treasury
management function. And there is frequently interaction between major
estimates of future capital investment and the financing of these. However,
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the dominant formal logic sequence reflected by the mode of model usage
flows from operations, investment, and then finally to the derivation of a
financing plan to support the operations and investment plans. In only two
cases was the modeling developed expressly in such a way as to support a
joint and simultaneous evaluation to the two sides of the financial
management equation.
FIGURE 5: Financial Management and the Application of Financial Planning Models
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This observation reinforces the conclusion that modeling support is
principally developed to handle computational complexity in the management
process. Complexity is much more characteristic of the operating and investment
side of management than the financing side. Furthermore, most of the companies
in the sample were operating at a point well removed from one of optimal
financial efficiency, with the result that top management were usually well
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aware of the general direction in which they wished to move the enterprise,
without perceiving the need for the support of a sophisticated modeling
system to provide them with additional information.
RESEARCH RESULTS - SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES
In this section, specific issues in the area of model development and
use are discussed, using selected aspects of the research data to illustrate
the discussion.
Management of Uncertainty in the Organization
As concluded previously, models are principally developed to represent
complexity, providing an efficient means of formally capt\iring understanding
about the workings of the enterprise, and the calculational capability to
generate outcome projections from a set of input assumptions. This in itself
reduces one source of uncertainty, by eliminating a potential source of con-
fusion, and frees the energies of the managerial organization to allov? a
greater concentration on uncertainty concerning the input assumptions and
the relative desirability of particulax sets of projected outcomes, Hov/-
ever, although this explantion of the role of models in the mamagerial
process seems plausible, even convincing, it really begs the question as to
why models are not progressively developed, in terms of their formal logics,
to recognize and incorporate an essential and pervasive reality of managerial
life, namely that any estimate about the future has a vemishing probability
of being borne out accurately. If the proposition is correct that models
are developed in response to and in step with organizational learning, then
we would expect to find, at least amongst those organizations with a relatively
long experience of the use of models, efforts to incorporate uncertainty
within model structures; and if not, then we should seek reasons for this.
It is certainly not the case that managers in the organizations we are
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discussing are unaware of either the nature of uncertainty, or the general
nature cf the decision-science methodologies available for analyzing prob-
lems under conditions of uncertainty.
In fact, one organization (II) had developed probabilistic modeling in
support of the analysis of policies by which to set the parameters of its
operating control systems. In this case, the probabilistic formulation was
not part of a simulation of the enterprise, but was a specialized analytical
technique applied to a particular class of problem, within the already
established structure of the enterprise and its operations. And in five
organizations (B, II, 12, K and P) sensitivity analysis sub-routines had been
developed for use in conjunction with their models. These were distinct,
programmed analyses, which allowed a planner, by the use of a single instruction,
to obtain the effect on a specified set of output parameters of varying a set
of input values in defined intervals around the values initially entered.
These organizations, and several other of the organizations in the sample,
also used sensitivity analysis in an unprogrammed way, relying on the curiosity
and intuition of the user to explore the effect on key output parameters of
variations in input assumptions.
To the extent, therefore, th.nt nodclintj is fom.Tlly developed to address
uncertainty in input assumptions, it predominantly does so by the use of
sensitivity analysis. In no case had there been an attempt to elaborate an
enterprise simulation model by incorporating probability distributions for
the main input variables, thereby enabling outputs to be provided in the form
of distributions.
One reason for not using a probabilistic formulation simply concerns
modeling complexity and data processing efficiency. Since the probability
distributions associated with the variables in an enterprise model are largely
interdependent, both within a single time period and sequentially through time
J
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pariods, to capture anything close to a valid representation of reality would
require massive ciatrices of data, and long processing times. For this kind of
modeling it was simply not considered by the organizations in the research
sample to be a feasible approach.
But even more important, a probabilistic form of modeling was not
perceived to be lelevant in connecting with the organizational process involved
in the management of uncertainty. This process is concerned with communication,
clarity of direction, and commitment to selected programs of action. Thus,
while managers as individuals can intuitively, and even explicitly, recognize
changing circumstances as a continuous process, in communicating with one
another and in providing direction they tend to distill the continuity into
discrete, differentiated sets of circumstances. This crystallizes the world
into more vivid scenarios, from which the rationale of related courses of
action can be more clearly constructed, thereby achieving a greater coherence
and ccmmitment to collective action.. It is a form of dramatization of actual
and anticipated events, and human beings tend to respond more positively to
drama than to fuzzy sets of continuous scenarios shading into one another.
Moreover, managers, outwardly at least, have to subscribe to the viewpoint
that outcomes, or results, are a joint function of the state of the environment
and the quality of managerial effort, even though the balance of the
contribution between these two inputs may be a matter of some conjecture.
And to the extent that the managerial contribution is believed to be enhanced
by clear, confident and unequivocal assertions about future achievements,
then it more or less follows as a logical imperative that this style be
adopted. Thus, it is seldom clear whether plans are intended to be descriptive,
as a basis for defining ex-ante actions in a reactive mode, or normative in
1
terns of their direction of action and control over future events and results.
1. As noted previously, the information structures used for planning in most
instajnces do not include the responsibility structure of the organization.
This is done consciously in aji attempt to remove the personal evaluative
connotation from planning. However, as is being suggested here, planning
in in fact aiabiguous in this regard.
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Nevertheless, within the complex reasoning intrinsic to the
organizational control process, corrmon sense dictates that the state of the
uncontrolled environment is the ultimate force which shapes the behavior of
the enterprise. Therefore, within the information structures which are
developed to facilitate control, there is the need to be able to shift
direction, coherently and decisively, when conditions warrant it. Contingency
planning relates directly to this need. And given the amount of analysis,
computation, communication and coordination involved in the preparation of a
plan in a large, complex organization, it is not surprising that these are
keyed off a relatively small numiier of defined scenarios.
An example of this process is provided by company P in the research
sample.
Company P is a very large manufacturer of technically
sophisticated machinery. Its products are used by a wide
range of companies in virtually every field of business
activity. In the past, product leadership and patent
protection have allowed the company to build a dominant
market position, both in the US and abroad. Recently,
however, competition has intensified severely. The main
uncertainty faced by the organization, therefore, concerns
levels of deiT'^nd, pricing, market share and revenue. The
information structure used by the organization is diagrammed
in Figure 5.
At the heart of the annual planning process is the
generation of a base case. A very considerable amount of
interaction amongst the managers in the organization takes
place in the creation of the base case. Central to this is
the development of a revenue forecast. Two main features
characterize the planning which goes into the revenue forecast:
o
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it is highly reduniant in terms of the nunbers of information
sources used as input to the forecast; and it relies on a
dialectic process which is carefully managed, at the level
just below top corporate management, to maintain openness and
a balance of power amongst the participants to avoid domination
of the process by any particular group. Modeling support is a
key element in the process because it removes the calculational
effort of translating assumptions into revenue and profit
projections; moreover, sensitivity analysis is used to identify
the areas where conflicting assumptions are important, because
they imply different actions and resource commitments, and
where they are not, because they would not significantly alter
action programs. Four main groups provide input to the revenue
forecasting. Line managers develop a forecast based on their
perceptions of levels of customer demand, competitor activity,
pricing tactics and product mix. The new product development
organization creates a forecast based on their perspective of
existing and new product programs. Central marketing also
develop a forecast, based on assessments of the general levels
of economic activity expected. And a special group, representing
competition, using the same methods of product and market strategy
analysis as is available to the rest of the organization, develop
a forecast of the share of the market they believe competition
can achieve by following rational strategies based on their
respective established positions in the market. All of these
forecasts are worked iteratively witliin the organization until
a reasonable level of concensus is reached as to what should
be contained in the base case.
The base case is not formally assigned a probability.
Nevertheless, it is understood to represent a concensus view
of the most likely outcome, given no additional strategic
initiatives by the organization and assuming no pi.rti'.c ilarly
fortuitous or calamitous events arising in the environment.
The alternative possible scenarios which have been generated
in the course of the planning process are not discarded; the
information is retained in the form of defined contingencies,
and their implications analyzed in respect to the current
commitment of resources and the related capability and means
of responding. Again, probabilities are not formally assigned;
but one would suppose that intuitive probabilities are part of
the planning process, since the likelihood of various
contingencies would affect the resource com.mitments made in
the final plans adopted, in the sense of containing the overall
risk facing the enterprise.
The strategy of the company is perceived as being driven
by new product development. Strategic programs principally
involve new product, or product modification activities.
These are maintained, once authorized, as identifiable programs
in the infonr.ation structure, until such time as they are
scheduled for market introduction when they are fed in to the
base case. This signifies a transference of managerial
77.
responsibility from program management to line operating
management. Monitoring of actual progress can therefore
be dona in relation to defined responsibility in a relatively
clear way. New strategic programs can be entered into the
process at any time; in other words, this activity is not
unrealistically forced into the pre-determined timing cycle
which is derived from the idea of an orderly set of procedures
for regulating the administrative process of the main body of
the organization's established business activities. Furthermore,
the planning horizon used for evaluating and subsequently
monitoring strategic programs is variable, tailored to the
specific characteristics of each program.
Product strategy program.s were originally analyzed using
the simulation model of the total enterprise. This is a
medium-sized model, containing both the physical characteristics
of the enterprise and their accounting representation. It is
written in APL and contains about 350 lines of code. However,
the planners found that the full model was unwieldy for this
purpose, especially in terms of assessing fine tradeoffs
between, for example, product specifications and field service
requirements. Gradually, a suite of models has been developed
specifically to address product strategy analysis. The suite
includes a unit profitability analysis model, a customer value
model (this is a model based on m.arket research input about the
use of products by customers and the functionality and value of
customer applications of products) , and a price indifference
model. These models can conveniently be used in an optimizing
mode to yield additional information about the sensitivity of
proposed strategies to policy or system constraints. They are
very efficient in use, and can be applied to the initial analysis
of a wide range of proposed strategy alternatives. Only the most
promising proposals j-re selected for simulation ou tht: full
system model before finalizing a program for review and
authorization by top management. This model development copes
efficiently with a specific decision task, and allows a formal
analysis of some aspects of the uncertainty in the decision
process. However, it also introduces an additional source of
uncertainty, one which the planners are aware of - namely the
possibility that the pre-screening routines using truncated
models may lead to sub-optimality because of a lack of the full
range of analysis of the complex interactions between proposed
new or modified products and the existing range of products.
This uncertainty is handled by the intuition and experience of
the planners, interpreting between the output of the specialized
models and the assumed effect these would have on the full
enterprise system.
Returning to the discussion of the main information
processing model used by the organization to produce plans and
budgets, once the base case has been established and approved
by top management, another information processing model is used
to translate this into a two-year operating plan and budget
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stated in terms of the responsibility structure of the
organization. This process is characterized by a ver;/
different style from the preceding steps. Uncertainty
is consciously excluded from explicit consideration, and
a negotiating style is adopted in a top-down mode. Top
management expects the total base case to be disaggregated
and allocated to operating units in such a way that the sum
of Che operating targets equals the base case. As a control
strategy, the judgment is clearly being made that the
organization has a greater likelihood of achieving the
results projected in the first two years of the base case
(and therefore also in the full five years of the base case)
if clearcut commitments are elicited from the organization
without reference to possible contingencies. However, an
interesting aspect of this process arose in discussion with
line managers. In a few instances (not often) middle levels
of management would accept targets, but not pass the full
magnitude of these dow-n the line. They would intervene in
the information disaggregation, absorbing some of the top-dotim
pressure and protecting the managers below them when they
considered that the full target would either create a
dysfunctional level of pressure, or alternatively call into
question the credibility in the organization of the target
-
setting process.
On a monthly basis, a special organizational unit at
the corporate level prepares for top management an update
of the five-year plan, using the full system model to carry
out the related data processing. This forecast is based on
data input developed by the central unit, which reflects
uncertainty resolution arising from a number of sources; in
particular, it reflects performance actually achieved to
date, modification of assumptions about the state of the
operating environment, changes in existing strategic programs,
and the feeding in of new strategic programs. This information
is used by top management to adjust resource commitments if
they feel this is warranted by changing conditions, and to
interpret and evaluate the flow of performance information
coming from the line organization. The contingency plans
developed at the time of the annual, long-range planning
exercise provide top management with a context within which
to interpret on-going performance, and alternative programs
of action to invoke if they feel that the monthly forecasts
are indicating a shift in the environmental conditions facing
the enterprise.
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In another company (Company J) , a different form of contingency
planning is used. A base case is constructed by the corporate planning
departnient using a set of regression equations operating on a base year.
The base year and the regression coefficients are set to creat a "most
likely" scenario. Around this base case two further projections are developed,
one representing a downside, or pesseioistic, case and the other representing
an upside, or optimistic, case. ;-/hile it is not really clear where these
proejctions might fall in terms of a formal probability distribution, the
additional information is perceived as being useful in facilitating cor-
porate managements' planning in the area of new investment, acquisitions
and financing.
With regard to the other main source of uncertainty, namely the
specification of a goal structure and the trade-offs between and amongst
goal dimensions, in two of the organizations the use of goal programming
(Hawkins and Adams [39], Lee and Lerro [52]) had been explored by modeling
staff. In both cases the approach had been abandoned because top manage-
ment had displayed no interest in it, or had actively resisted it. The
reasons for top management resistance were not entirely clear. On the one
hand, to put the financial models into a suitable form for goal programming
had required a reduction of the number of variables in the models and a
degree of re-casting and redefinition of variables. Even though the reduced
models provided valid output projections, as judged by a comparison with
the output from the full models, top management had expressed a lack of
belief in the reduced models. And on the other hand, there was, in one
instance in particular, an overt reluctance on top managements' part to
address goal weightings explicitly.
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In sunrnary, a nuaber of procedures were observed in the research
companies relating directly to the effect which uncertainty has on
the organization and its financial planning and control:
1. A differentiation is niade between those activities
which are perceived to contain high levels of
imcertainty, and those for which there is relatively
less uncertainty; in areas of high uncertainty, a
higher degree of information flow and analysis is
used to help define the areas of uncertainty, and
considerable redundancy is built in to information
Bources and processing of information.
2. Sensitivity analysis is used to explore ranges of
possible outcome; contingency plans are developed.
3. Planning procedures for uncertain areas are more
flexible; re-planning is geared to the resolution of
imcertainty with the passage of time, rather than to
a pre-determined planning cycle.
A. Responsibility for strategic decisions tends to be
shared widely in the organization, thereby dispersing
within the organization the risk to individual mana-
gers of failure of a particular investment program.
It can be seen from these examples that uncertainty is
Indeed salient and eiqilicit in financial planning. Even though
modeling, at least in the form of a general, total-enterprise,
simulation, does not formally reflect this in terms of the
development of the logic structure of the model, it is clear that
the use of models is nonetheless central to the development of
organizational control strategies for coping effectively with
uncertainty. This modeling support takes the form of two distinct
contributions: on the one hand, specialized modeling is developed.
Independent, in a formal sense, of the main information processing
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Eodel, to deal with selected, but important, aspects of uncertainty
in relation to specific types of decision that are perceived as
being key to the investment strategy of the enterprise; and, on the
other hand, the modeling support allows more frequent and intensive -
formulation of plans by providing computational capacity. While,
at first glance, models may appear to be unsophisticated in their
treatment of uncertainty, when viewed as an intrinsic part of the
organizational decision and control process, in conjunction with
the managerial organization, they may be interpreted to be
considerably sophisticated. Perhaps there is a weakness in our
theoretical understanding of the nature and consequences of
uncertainty in organizational decision making rath3r t*-an short-
comings in the development and application of models in practice.
Rosenhead, et. al. [78] address this issue in a discussion of the
analysis supporting strategic investment decisions, pointing out
that managers, when faced by considerable uncertainty, may discard
the idea of strict optimality, preferring instead robustness and
stability as main criteria — that is to say, to make decisions
which are likely to lead to satisfactory results within a wide
range of future possible states of the environment, and which
involve a minimization of the present commitment of resources so
as to preserve future flexibility.
Technical and Organizational Aspects of Model Use
Following on the theme of the preceding sub-section, an interesting issue
which arises in respect to the development and use of financial planning models
is whether this alters the locus of decision making within the organization.
An important assumption, which follows directly from the bureaucratic theory
of organization, and which is reflected in much of the managerial literature,
is that top management should direct the important affairs of the organization.
In the case of investment decision making, therefore, one might expect top
management to want to exercise as great a degree of centralized control as
possible. This of course implies that top management must have available to
it a relatively complete set of information relevant to the investment
opportunities available to the enterprise. That this is seldom the case is
a central theoretical and practical concern. Mueller [65], for example,
conceptualizes the firm as a venture capital market, and argues that initially
the firm is more effective than external markets because of the relative ease
with which entrepreneurial information and funds can be matched without loss
of control (i.e., from the organization) of proprietary information. V7ith
increasing size, however, the flow of entrepreneurial information to those in
the organization who retain authority over the allocation of funds may be
stifled, resulting in a steady diminishing of the firm's effectiveness in
entrepreneurial development.
One solution to this problem is to concentrate on improving the flow of
information to top management so that they can exercise a strategic choice
function with the knowledge of the set of opportunities available to the
enterprise. Carter [12] proposes just such a solution, based on an interactive
computer-based methodology. He suggests a system to make available to top
management a knowledge of the characteristics of all projects being considered,
the financial variances of each' and co-variances amongst projects, and their
effect on the projected financial characteristics of the existing set of
operations, i.e., on the base case. Carter's proposal is a powerful one, but
it is essentially technical in nature, leaving unexplored the normative
dimensions of the problem, namely the motivation of people in the organization
to share with top management their knowledge of the opportunities available,
along with the breadth of analysis of them required by such an approach. An
alternative solution is to seek to create in a delegated context conditions
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such that subordinate managers think and act in the same way that top management
would possessing the same set of inforrr.ation. This implies a greater downward
flow of information in the organization so that subordinate managers in tlieir
decision making can combine the breadth of perspective obtained from top
managements' total view of the enterprise with their own specialized knowledge
of the opportunities existing at their level and relating to their particular
scope of responsibilities. Even so, it is clear, in theory at any rate, that
the delegated solution can never aspire to the same formal decision-making
optimality of the information processing solution because of the difficulty
of assessing and managing the interdependencies, especially the financial
interdepend encies, amongst investment projects arising from different areas
within the organization. Nevertheless, the delegated solution may still
recommend itself because of other benefits, such as the development of greater
psychological commitment to decisions and their implementation, greater
personal identification with the aims and values of the organization,, and
ultimately the development of a more robust entrepreneurial capability through
the creation of a widespread innovacive culture in the organization.
In the research sample, it was clear that people were indeed sensitive
to the possibility that the use of modeling could shift the locus of decision
making in the organization. Any major innovation has the potential to alter
the established balance of power in an organization, but control over
information is especially potent in this regard, as emphasized by Naylor [66, 73]
in his analysis of the political environment in which modeling takes place.
In successful modeling developments, management appear to avoid a major shift
in the locus of decision making, preferring instead to use modeling to
strengthen established procedures rather than altering them in any radical
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way. Company L provides a clear example of this.
Company L is a large, integrated international oil company.
It is capital intensive, and uses sophisticated planning and
monitoring systems. Data processing is largely centralized, and
dominated by big, batch-mode systems; however, recently an
internal time sharing service has been successfully developed.
The organization structure is based on profit and investment-
responsible divisions, defined in the first instance on a
geographical basis, and then on the basis of type of activity
(e.g., exploration, production, refining and marketing).
The model, or modeling system examined in the research,
was developed as part of a process of reorientating the planning
approach in the organization. Previously, planning had been
based on a three-year horizon, making minimal distinction between
strategic programs and continuing operations. The company's
entry into North Sea development altered the investment pattern
significantly (single investment programs could now entail
$1 billion of outlay, compared with previous patterns of several
programs of smaller am.ounts). Top management requested the
creation of a new planning system to deal with strategic
investment. Corporate planning staff first developed a working
definition, to the effect that any project which was either
known to entail, or could potentially entail, an investment of
$10 million or more was to be considered part of the strategic
investment program - other investment was to be considered part
of operations and dealt with in the operating planning and
budgeting system already established. A ten-year planning
horizon was adopted for the planning of strategic investment.
The modeling system, then, was intended specifically to
support the planning and monitoring of the company s strategic
investment program. It was first taken up by the Corporate
Controller's staff but, when it became apparent that they were
developing an accounting-based model, the President intervened
and assigned the modeling project to the corporate planning staff.
The planning staff developed and implemented the system over a
three-year period. It is an interactive system, based on
deterministic financial projections; initially it was programmed
in BASIC, but was subsequently re^^itten by the data processing
staff in FORTRAN to make it more efficient from a cor.puter-usage
standpoint.
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Each division maintains its planning data base on central
data processing facilities, and can access its data whenever it
needs to. The basic input is project data ~ descriptive data
and financial projections. The system calculates net present
value of a project, and has a standardized output format
containing qualitative description, financial projections and
net present value. It also has the capability to select a
program of projects to iraximize expected net present value,
within specified constraints (for example, the constraints
may reflect project interdependencies such as sequencing, or
total spending limits specified by period). Typically a
division will go through several runs until satisfied with a
particular investment program. The selected program is then
submitted to the next level of tnanagement as printed output
and as data transfer to the planning data base at that level.
Ultimately, a proposed program for the total company is
consolidated at the corporate level. There, additional runs
of the model are used to estimate the effect on expected net
present value and on the cash flow profile of eliminating
proposed projects (substantially more capital is invariably
requested than top management is willing to authorize).
Changes in the investment program are negotiated back down
the management hierarchy until a set of programs are finally
agreed upon. Corporate management do not access divisional
data bases unless authorized to do so by divisional management;
nor do they themselves eliminate any projects since, given a
cut-back in capital allocations, a division may well prefer to
re-assess its priorities based on the information residing at
that level.
The modeling system was developed to support the planning and monitoring
of the strategic component of the organization's activities. This involved a
judgmentally-developed definition to describe the managerial distinction
between strategic and operational activities. The management of the strategic
component was then clearly differentiated from the operating component by
establishing a different set of procedures, and indeed a different managerial
style. The planning horizon, information structure and frequency of
re-planning were all tailored to the specific nature of the strategic
investment process, a process which was perceived as being characterized by
greater uncertainty, and perhaps risk, than the operating component, as well
as containing the potential of longer-term discontinuities in the configuration
of the enterprise and the availability and demands on its resources. The
greater uncertainty was addressed by aT.phasizing the need to share information
in the organization. The modeling system was designed as a focus for this;
however, although the form of the modeling system would have permitted a much
greater degree of technical centralization of the information base, precisely
along the lines proposed by Carter, top m.anagement have consciously and carefully
resisted this approach. They prefer to work towards a delegated,
organizational solution to the problem, giving as reasons the maintenance of
a system of mutual trust in the organization, acknowledgement of confidence
by top management in the competence and motivation of managers at lower levels
of the hierarchy, and the development of greater degrees of psychological
cotnmitraent on the part of the line organization to identifying, analyzing and
subsequently carrying out strategic investments. Toe majiagement believe
that the information generated, relevant to strategic investment activities,
is in fact a function of the managerial style they adopt. In other words,
information in an organization is not perceived as being a given, set resource,
but is a variable quantity determined at least to some extent by the roles and
attitudes of the members of the organization. These, in turn, are shaped by
the managerial style and procedures established for sharing and using
information in the organization.
Subsequently, after some experience of the use of the modeling system,
top management became concerned about a lack of common definition and
quantification of variables in the model, and different perceptions of, and
willingness to accept, risk within the organization. Sensing that this could
introduce an unintended bias into the company's strategic development, a senior
executive was appointed at the corporate level to manage, on a world-wide basis,
the planning and carrying out of strategic investment. Thus, the differentiation
between the strategic and operating components of the organization's activities,
which began as a differentiation of information structures and procedures.
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finally moved towards a forral organizational differentiation, with separate
lines of reporting to corporate management for each of them.
Data Management
The management of the data bases associated with planning models can be
extremely problematic. The nature of the problems are to some extent a
function of the information structures and type of planning model chosen; but,
it is also the case that the availability of useful, or meaningful, data can
shape the choice of model. The data problems associated with a planning model
are largely reflections of unresolved data problems inherent in an organization's
monitoring systems, but additional problems can be involved if the organiza-
tion chooses to address its long-range, or strategic planning in a totally
different perspective from the way in which it generates its information for
budgeting and monitoring of operations. An example of this is provided by
Company H.
Company H is a very large, diverse manufacturing concern.
Its operations are predominantly in the United States and Canada.
Products are either consumer products, distributn.d correctly to
the retail market, or components of other manufacturers' products,
also mainly consumer products. Sales volume is increasing at a
relatively stable and fairly low rate. While diversification has
been pursued by means of periodic acquisitions, these have been
small relative to the size of the total company; the traditional
product lines still account for about 60% of sales. The company's
operations are geographically dispersed, and characterized by
estremely high logistics complexity and moderate technical
complexity. A few years ago major losses were recognized due to
plant obsolescence, and planning is partly driven by the need to
modernize facilities. In addition, however, the company's main
businesses are mature, growing slowly, and generating funds in
excess of their capacity for reinvestment. The need to find new
avenues of development, therefore, is also a major driving force
in the organization's planning.
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One response to the losses which were incurred was a
cornmitment by top manage-iient to a greater emphasis on planning
as a basis for controlling the company. A corporate planning
executive was appointed from one of the major consulting firms.
He initiated the development of a simple planning model. The
model is based on highly aggregated accounting identities
representing each of the company's divisions, and creates a
consolidated representation of the company from these along with
the inclusion of capital structure, finance expense, corporate
overhead expense and corporate tax. The equations were estimated
by the use of regression analysis methods applied to historical
performance data, and v;ork. on a base year which is constructed
to be representative of typical, recent performance. The purpose
of the model initially was sLmply to provide top management with
an efficient way of collectively testing assumptions about future
performance. It served the purpose of developing amongst the top
executive group a clear consensus that, even under the most
optimistic set of assumptions, the existing businesses could not
produce satisfactory growth in sales and profits. This led to a
strategic re-conceptualization of the enterprise for planning
purposes. At the sam.e time, however, the operating structure is
still the dominant one when addressing modernization, operating
planning and budgeting matters. This information structure and
translation problem is depicted in Figure 7.
FIGURE 7: Planning and Operating Infcrmation Structures (H)
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Strategic planning is conducted within the market framework,
particularly in ter::::s of trying to match capabilities with future
market demands. Long-range and operating planning is conducted
in the framework of products, distribution, production and
responsibility structure. The changed strategic conceptualization
has led the organization into new areas of business which, it is
claimed, would probably not have been pursued if thinking had
continued in the previous rode; for exampla, acquisitions have been
made of companies with radically different types of product from
the company's traditional range, where the organization's expertise
in the management of complex logistics systems is judged to be a
critical competitive advantage.
Long-range planning, operating planning and budgeting are
supported by information processing and analysis models, both at
the divisional level and at the corporate level. Output from
divisional planning models is fed into a corporate model which
analyzes and consolidates the information, supporting the corporate
review and approval of divisional plans. The original corporate
model, the highly aggregated accounting model, continues to be
used by top management. More detail has been added to it, and its
output format has been altered to bring it closer to the format of
regular financial reports. It is used to support acquisition
planning, and the formation of views about the potential of
existing business units as part of the review process of divisional
plans and performance.
As can be seen from this example, the information structures used for
strategic planning do not entirely flow from a straightforward aggregation
of operating data. In fact, there is considerable difficulty experienced in
the organization in translating back and forth between the operating
information structure and the strategic planning structure. Thought is bein^
given as to how to support this in a formal way by developing a conceptual
connection and related information processing routines, but as yet little
progress has been made; for the present, the strategic planning information
structure remains "ungrounded" in the reality the organization is accustomed
to dealing with.
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Data management prcbleiT3 in an organization's monitoring and reporting
systems are generally less visible than those which arise in the context
of financial planning models. A momentum and tradition is built in to a'
reporting system, and the immediacy of having to produce reports creates
a pressure to make it work somehow. Extremely difficult conceptual prob-
lems are often resolved by ideological arguments rather than by reasoned
analysis, such as "every product must bear its fair share of overheads."
While these kinds of statement have essentially no meaning, they nevertheless
provide a basis for a working solution to the problem of what to do each
month concerning the distribution of overhead expenses within the reporting
structure. And these anomalies can be perpetuated for years until some
event occurs which siibjects them to closer examination. The development
of a fincincial palnning model can be such an event. The kind of question
involved is no longer what should be done in the reporting structure with
overhead expenses already incvirred, but instead, what will be the level
of future expenses associated with a projected volume and mix of products
which is radically different from those with which we have had experience
in the past? The historical data base of the reporting system may be a
very unreliable source of evidence to resort to in attempting co answer
this sort of question.
One way to avoid the issue is to choose a modeling approach which begins
with input data in virtually the same degree of detail as the transaction
data base on which the reporting system- operates. Company G(l), described previously,
had chosen this approach. But it is only appropriate for a small, relatively
simple business, and it does not provide a model suited to longer-term planning
and the exploration of changes in strategic direction. Another way is Co use
a base year, and to create forward projections by the application of
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regression-derived relationships amongst the main variables in the model.
This type of modeling, which was used by company H at the corporate level,
and indeed by other companies in the research sample, operates at a level of
aggregation where for example the distribution of expenses amongst finer
analytical classifications than are contained in the model is probably not
significant for the intended use of the model; it skims over the surface of
the problem. The model's validity, however, is only a function of the validity
of the accounting structure on which it is based, and even then only within
fairly narrow ranges of the variables in the model around the range of past
experience.
The approach to aggregation and disaggregation of data adopted by the
modeling in company 1(2) is especially interesting. The primary input to the
model from the managerial organization is an estimate of the timing, length
and delivery rates of major product programs. The model disaggregates these
into product volximes, and then into production rates of parts and components
grouped on the basis of learning-curve coefficients. From this, the model
can develop cost projectio.is, and material, labor and plant capacity
requirements. It is a particularly appropriate algorithm for disaggregating
data, providing information useful to a wide range of strategic and tactical
decisions in the organization. Nevertheless, the validity of the algorithm,
and of the model therefore, in fact depends upon the empirical verification
of learning-curve coefficients, which in turn depends upon the capture, coding
and distribution of actual costs in the transaction data base and the
accounting system. There is the question, for example, of defining and
measuring product cost; and there is also the question of the level of ex-
penditures on manufacturing support services and capital equipment which
presi:iinably are vital to causing product costs to behave in the way they are
intended to. These are critical issues to that organization, bearing in
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mind that the model is used to support bidding on major contracts which may
extend many years into the future.
The question of data management and reliability is inextricably bound up
with the question of model validation. Models are not generally validated in
any strict sense; validity is usually a question of plausibility, which in
turn is conditioned by experience. Part of that experience is simulated by
what the reporting system has been representing as reality. And since models
in one way or another are usually based on, or at least influenced by, the
infoirmation provided by the reporting system, the validation process is
essentially tautological- Complicating the issue even further is the con-
fusion concerning the status of model output in respect to a descriptive or
evaluative purpose, a confusion which may deliberately be left unresolved.
In one of the research companies, automatic data transfer was being considered
between the transaction data base and the planning data base, on the grounds
that it would increase the efficiency of data handling. The proposal was
rejected because it was feared that inefficiencies in past operations would
be institutionalized by inclusion in the data base from which plans and
responsibility budgets and performance measures are developed for use in the
organization
.
Modeling Across the Boundary of the Organization
While most of the models examined in the course of the research were
developed for internal use within the organization, two were also intended
specifically to satisfy the needs of users external to the organization.
Both organizations (12 and N) are highly dependent on Government business,
and therefore have to be able to meet the information stipulations in respect
to contract bids, subsequent progress reporting, and cost re-negotiation in
the event of a change in contract schedules.
93.
The form of modeling in 1(2) has already been described. The model
effectively handles the external and internal demands on it. Where differences
exist in, for example, cost definitions or classifications, the model is able
to re-cast these in the fonn required by either party. Recently, the company
has made the modeling system available to the DOD controllers, instructing them
in its use, and has continued to update the model parameters. This allows the
DOD controllers to simulate the cost effects of re-scheduling a contract prior
to its bei.ig requested. The management of the company believes this will
cause a decrease in the number of requests for re-scheduling, thereby re-
ducing a major source of uncertainty to their organization.
In the case of company N, however, the modeling system is entirely
dominated by the external requirements. The system was developed by the
company's control staff with the primary aim of supplying the reports
required by the Government agencies they deal with. The system is based on
a project structure, and places demands on the project managers in the
organization to develop input data. The output data, however, is in a form
which is not recognizable to the managers. The system has created an intense
degree of resentment amongst the project managers; despite chis, the modeling
system was judged to be successful, since it does satisfy the limited purpose
for which it was developed. However, it appears to have the potential to be
much more useful with relatively little additional developmental effort. In
the first place, it could be modified in such a way as to provide information
to project managers in a form which they can use. And secondly, it could be
developed into a divisional simulation model, for use especially in financial
and manpower planning.
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Economic versus Accour.ting Frameworks
The economic framework was marginally represented in the modeling
structures observed, mainly within decision-making sub-routines of modeling
systems.
In two of the systems, however, the economic framework is a prominent
feature of the information structure. In company L, previously described,
the management of strategic investment is supported by a modeling system
based on project cash flows, net present value, and an optimizing sub-routine.
One manager in that organization, noting that the accounting framework had
been deliberately excluded from the system, commented that it was considered
inappropriate for the purpose, and that sufficient flexibility was in any
case available in the accounting policies of the company to manage the pattern
of accounting earnings, without having to worry about the impact on them of
strategic investment decisions. But in another firm (K) , also a large,
integrated, international oil company, the relationship between internal rate
of return and accounting rate of return was a matter of central concern in
the financial modeling developed to support top managements' assessment of
the strategic direction of the enterprise. Just as in the case of company L,
the management of company K was responding to the changing pattern of investment
in the oil industry. The modeling support, however, was directed to an earlier
stage in the decision process, prior to the commitment to a strategic direction^
it was aimed at supporting the strategic re-assessmsnt itself.
Company K is a large international oil company, organized
into operating subsidiaries. These are defined by the nature of
the business (e.g., oil, chemicals), and within the oil business
by type of activity (e.g., exploration and development,
production, refining and marketing). The corporate model creates
a financial simulation of the operating subsidiaries, and
consolidates these, along with input concerning the capital
structure, finance expense, overhead expense and corporate tax,
to provide a simulation of the total company.
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The simulation of an operating subsidiary is created from
an investment module. A module is simply an investment outlay
followed by subsequent operating cash flows. A module is
characterized by the size of initial investment, the split of
the investment amongst working capital, fixed assets and outlay
which is immediately expensed, timing and life of operating cash
flows, internal rate of return and accounting rate of return.
These characteristics are then estimated for each operating
subsidiary by observation of typical investment projects, using
post-completion audits and line management input. The financial
simulation of a subsidiary is constructed by allowing a build-up
of modules through simulated time periods (years) until a steady
state is reached. The output of the simulation is loosely
validated by comparing it with the actual results of a subsidiary
from past years. The simulated growth rate can be altered either
by altering the frequency of addition of new modules or by scaling
up or do\.m the size of the modules by a specified factor.
Essentially, then, the model assumes that future performance of
a subsidiary is determined by its past investments and its future
investments; however, the model was subsequently modified to allow
sales margins to be a further variable determining performance.
The model was developed by corporate planning staff, using
a high level, interactive planning language. The model is used
directly by the corporate planning staff, and the information
output provided to the executive committee.
The purpose of the model was to assist corporate decisions
about such things as the rate and mix of investment, financial
policy and accounting policy. It was used particularly to trace
the effect on internal rate of return and accounting rate of
return on moving from an established rate and mix of investment
to new rates and mixes, examining the simulated performance
(measured by IRR and ARR; through transition phases until
reaching nev; steady states.
This is an interesting approach to modeling. The form of the model
very directly reflects the purpose for which it was developed, and it connects
exactly with the way in which the top management of the organization perceive
themselves as controlling the strategic direction of the enterprise. Because
of the highly capital-intensive nature of the company, and because of the very
marked differences in measurements of value and returns deriving from the
accounting and the economic frameworks in this industry, the incorporation of
both frameworks in the model is clearly important. This, however, is not
always the case, especially where capital intensity and rate of investment
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are less salient determinants of the performance of the enterprise. In
company J a corporate financial model had also been developed to support top
managements' re-assessment of the strategic direction of the enterprise.
However, in this case capital investment in established businesses was of
relatively little importance; in fact, the re-assessment was initiated by the
realization that existing businesses were generating a surplus of funds, and
that diversification by acquisition was the likely avenue for the strategic
development of the company.
Company J is a large international manufacturing concern
with dominant market positions in its traditional range of
products. These are primarily sold to industrial users, and
sales levels are cyclical following the level of investment and
production in the markets served. Diversification is being
pursued, primarily by acquisition; new business areas now
account for 30% of revenue and operating profit. From a
financial standpoint, strategy is aimed at preserving the
market positions established in the traditional areas of
operation, and using the surplus funds generated by these
to diversify so as to add stability to the pattern of sales
and earnings. Through the 1975 recession results were steady,
in contrast with the marked downturns experienced in previous
recessions. Organization structure is based on profit and
investment responsible divisions, defined in terras of main
product lines; however, a geographical structure is also
reflected in the organization, as is a very complex legal
structure (several operating subsidiaries are not wholly-o^vmed)
.
Corporate planning and planning at the divisional level are
only loosely coupled. Data processing is centralized and
dominated by transaction processing, batch mode applications.
Some data processing, and systems development, are decentralized
to the divisional level.
Corporate financial planning is the responsibility of the
Corporate Controller. To assist with the information processing
and analysis associated with the planning function he initiated
the development of a model. The model is a deterministic,
accounting simulation, programmed in PORTRAIT, and is used
only in a batch mode. It took initially about four man-months
to develop over a period of a year.
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The model uses as a base period the most recent full year's
financial results. It then takes as input divisional estimates
of, for example, sales growth rates, net income as a percentage
of sales, asset turnover ratios for working capital items, and
planned expenditures and retirements in respect to fixed assets.
The model generates divisional financial projections, and a
consolidated picture for the whole company. Divisional input
is intended to reflect "most likely" performance. Corporate
planning staff, working from divisional input, generate different
scenarios reflecting their judgment of a "pessimistic", "most
likely" and "optimistic" future for each division and for the
company as a whole; in producing the "most likely" forecast for
a specific division, they adjust for the degree of bias which,
from experience, they judge each divisional management builds
m to its plans. vhia experience is supportieci Dy a regression
analysis on past performance, from which regression coefficients
are derived connecting the behavior of the main financial performance
variables.
While the model is simple in concept, it handles a
relatively large amount of complexity and calculational effort
(e.g., currency translations, intra-company transfers, tax
computation, etc.). Two developments are now in progress:
the system is being modified to allow interactive use; and a
reporting and analysis module is being added to allow ex-post
monitoring against plan.
The output of the model was initially used exclusively by
the strategy committee of corporate management to support
diversification planning. Increasingly, however, it is being
used in the negotiation of performance targets between corporate
and divisional management, and is likely also to be used in the
monitoring and assessment of divisional performance.
While it is possible to challenge from a normative theoretical
standpoint the top management perspective about the strategic financial
objectives and direction of company J, the instrumentality of the model
within that framework is quite clear. The operationalization of an
acquisition-based strategy is effected, from a financial viewpoint, within
an accounting and legal framework, not primarily within a normative economic
framewo rk.
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The Sirgple-Complex Dimension
The evidence about the nature of successful financial planning models
clearly appears to challenge the assertion that modeling support should be
simple - the simpler the better. Of greater importance, the logic structure
of a model must connect clearly and directly with the user's cognitive
understanding of the world, and focus on the source of his concern in a way
that connects with his beliefs about how he can exert influence and control
over events. No doubt if a user's cognitive model of the world is a simple
one, then a simple model may be appropriate. But managers in large, complex
organizations have not usually attained their positions by relying on simple,
or simplistic, views of the world. On the contrary, the^/ recognize that the
activities and events for which they are planning are complex; it is frequently
this complexity that motivates their interest in the potential of modeling
support in the first place. Therefore, a simple model is unlikely to be
plausible to them in terms of its validity in representing the situation with
which they are concerned
.
It also has to be borne in mind that the users of financial planning
models are usually staff personnel in the planning and control function, not
line managers directly. Therefore, models can capture a degree of analytical
sophistication which may exceed at any given point in time the cognitive
capabilities of line managers. Pursuing the theme of modeling as a formal
organizational learning process, it may be argued that models should be
continually developed to lead the cognitive capabilities of managers,
otherwise models may be endangered by a perception that their value is
limited or diminishing because they do not enhance the availability of
information in the organization beyond that which is intuitively present.
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Even so, modelers have to be sensitive to the nature and extent of the
imbalance between the logic structures of models and the cognitive structures
used by the managers in the organization. In company P, the modelers decided
to attempt to simplify, as they perceived it, the corporate model which had
been developed and implemented. By means of a factor analysis method, they
reduced the 350 equations of the corporate model to 35, without sacrificing
anything in terms of the output projections produced by the model; in other
words, the reduced model was validated by comparing its output with the output
of the larger model. The modelers believed the reduced model would be simpler
and more efficient in use because of its lesser demands for data input and
processing time; and they also had in mind the potential use of the model in
a more sophisticated mode, for example, using it in a goal programming
framework. The reaction of line managers, and indeed of many of the direct
staff users, was one of suspicion and hostility. The modelers were sensitive
enough to abandon this avenue of development before any lasting damage was
done to the relationships in the organization amongst models, modelers and
users.
TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF MODELS
A striking aspect of the research data is the wide range of types of
financial planning models in successful use in organizations. This invites
an attempt to categorize models into a typology. This section attempts to
move towards a satisfactory framework for model classification.
In one sense, the search for a general typology of models is important
to scholars of management because of the more general insight it provides
to an understanding of the managerial process. The differentiation of
models in relation to specific problem areas can tell us a great deal
about the cognitive differences between and amongst areas. Essentially,
the information processing and logic structures in models is likely to
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provide powerful descriptive evidence about the organizational logics
inherent in the planning, problem-solving and control processes. But
the search for a typology also has a pragmatic purpose, in the sense of
providing ways of thinking about the issue of choosing areas of applica-
tion for modeling, the general design parameters for rr.odels, and a strat-
tegy for developing and implementing models. It provides a way of syn-
thesizing experiences gained by some organizations in their search for
satisfactory modeling configuracions , and of providing a generalized
framework for extending this experience to other organizations. Thus,
the ultimate purpose of a typology is prescriptive, with the aim of in-
creasing the probability of success of investments in this area of organi-
zational technology.
But a major intellectual issue presents itself in the search for a
typology; namely, what sources of evidence are relevant in approaching the
problem? Mason and Mitroff [58] propose a theoretical framework by which
to direct and organize research into information systems development.
Gorry and Scott Morton [28] also propose such a framework, similar in many
respects to yanon and Mitroff s, but differing in tvo ways: first, tneir
approach is essentially more pragmatic and prescriptive than Mason and
Mitroff 's; and secondly, they do not accord the same salience to the
characteristics of an individual user. Rather, Gorry and Scott Morton
relate directly to an organizational classification of managerial problems
in suggesting the characteristics of information systems to support the
related problem-solving processes. This difference can be reconciled
by an assumption that an organization possesses a capability for placing
people in roles in such a way that there is a reasonable congruence between
the problem-solving styles of the incumbents and their organizational roles.
Lorange and Rockart [55] directly adopt the Gorry and Scott Morton frame-
work and extend it specifically in respect to the development and use of
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computer-based planning systems. The approach used in the current dis-
cussion is similar to Lorange and Rockart's, in that it begins from the
standpoint of an analysis of the managerial process. However, it goes
further than their approach in the degree of definition of both the man-
agerial process and the characteristics of the modeling support activity.
A Framework for Typology
In this subsection, a framework is proposed within which a typology
of models can be discussed. The framework is intended to assist with
the determination of predominant patterns of modeling in relation to
managerial application, in the face of a high level of complexity. The
raw research observations are presented in Table 7; the framework is
intended to provide a means for interpreting these observations. Es-
sentially, an intuitive kind of factor analysis is being pursued, whereby
the detail of primary observations is being mapped into a framework at a
higher level of aggregation. Even so, it has to be admitted at this
j\incture that there is not an exact mapping between the primary observa-
tions and the summary variables in the framework.
The observations in Table 7 are consistent with the analyses already
presented in Tables 5 and 5. However, in Table 7 only the characteristics
of the successful models are presented, since the unsuccessful models
would simply confound the present analysis.
Throughout the discussion, it has been the purpose to describe
modeling activities, and to propose explanations of the success or failure
of modeling. The present analysis is seeking a further source of explana-
tion, in terms of the fit between models and managerial application. How-
ever, in so doing it is necessary to capture the other sources of ex-
planation of degree of success in the framework in order to discern com-
prehensive patterns. It is, of course, a moot point whether the sequencing
of the logic of explanation implied by the framework is appropriate. In
the final analysis, the test of this is essentially one of plausibility.
which requires substantiation through additional research work.
The logic of this part of the discussion, step-by-stsp, is as
follows
:
a) PROBLEM AR£A«—MODEL
The contention is that there should exist a consistent and
generalizable pattern between the managerial application
(problem area) and the characteristics of the model; and,
moreover, that the degree of success of a modeling activity
is explainable, in part, by an appropriate fit between a
model and its intended application. As already noted, the
field research data are used to construct this aspect of the
theoretical framework, and it is, therefore, not possible
to use the research observations to validate the framework;
the framework, in other words, is no more than a hypothesis
for further testing.
b) PROBLEM AREA-* USER >MODEL
Intervening between the problem area and the model is a user.
It might be suggested that the model does not necessarily, indeed
carjriot, construct a faithful representation of the problem area
itself, but rather constructs part of the reality as perceived
by the user. The validation of the model is likely to be con-
ducted in terms of the user's understanding of the model in rela-
tion to his perception of the problem area.
c) PROBLEM AREA < USER #MODEL
t J" NATURE OF THE '
ENTERPRISE-ENVIRONMENT
SYSTEM
Portraying the modeling process more broadly than simply that of
a user relating to a problem area, it is necessary to recognize
the general characteristics of the enterprise-environment system
within which problem areas are specifically defined. This will
impact both the definition of the problem area, the priorities
assigned to particular problem areas v/ithin a total set, and
the structure of a m.odel designed to assist a user in dealing with
a specific problem area.
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TABL5 7: Modeling Faacures, Information Output and Application
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roorata Manaaement Process
enario Generation
ai Formation/Direction Setting,
cision Support (direct)
ixJcrate-Business Unit Interface
ng-range Planning
gotiation of Budgets
porting (actual and variances),
rformance Analysis
siness Unit Management Process
enario Generation
al Fomation/Direction Setting.
ng-range Planning
cision Support
sponsibility Budgeting
porting (actual and variances).
rfo_inance Analysis
:-A.NtZATION
_2.
__2.
K
>< VL ^ ^x
I I
! i
j<^- «
X
V X ! X
M J
ti x_v< K.>5_
M ><. K X X. ^ 5<_
"« < X X
y» X % 'A
UK }< «
..„ ){ ^
fC
_
)<
18 ADSFGGHHI I IJKLMNO?
(1X2X1X2X1X2X3)
106.
d) ORGAIJIZATIONAL
CONTEXT
I
PROBLEM AREA-< USER » MODEL
\_ 1' NATURE OF THE '
ENTERPRISE-ENVIRON-^'ENT
SYSTEM
Finally, the success of a modeling activity, or even prior to that
the choice itself of modeling as a possible solution to a perceived
managerial problem, is likely to be conditioned by the organiza-
tion's capability to support the activity. It is essential to
include in the framework, therefore, the organizational context
within which users experience modeling support, and m.odeling staff
conduct the design and implem.entation activities.
The ensuing discussion will focus on the problem area-model relation-
ship. Prior to doing so, however, it is necessary to explain the other
variables in the framework and their impact on the degree of m.odeling
success.
Enterprise-Environment System : Since models are predominantly representa-
tion of an enterprise, or of parts of an enterprise, the nature of the
enterprise will clearly be a major input influencing the design of a
model. In an integrated oil company, where the nature of the business
demands large amounts of capital investment with long lead-times and pay-
back periods, one would expect this to be a prominent feature of related
modeling, and indeed this is the case. In contrast, in consiimer product
companies, much shorter lead-times are prevalent and capital investment
is relatively less important, and dispersed; the modeling support is,
therefore, more likely to be based on product-market activities, with
capital investment as a secondary focus.
Beyond these considerations, the nature of the environment, although
not entering directly into the logic structure and output formats of
models, does influence the design and use of m.odels. In particular, the
sources and nature of the uncertainties in the environment influence the
focus of models cind degress of flexibility built in to the way the model
is, or can be, used. Additionally, the history of the enterprise-environment
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system, surrmarized in terms of the measured performance of the enter-
prise, clearly impact the choice of managerial priorities and the design
features of models.
These considerations can be conveniently summarized v/ithin the
general rubric of strategy. The concept of strategy is ill-defined in the
literature, and it is not the present purpose to enter into a debate con-
cerning the definition of the concept. Generally speaking, however, the
use of the term is intended in the current context to include both a
descriptive component - covering the enterprise, its environment, the
past performcince of the enterprise, and the stock of resources available
to the enterprise - and a prescriptive component - in terms of a managerial
assessment of the enterprise and its environment, and a choice of means
of dealing with perceived uncertainties and risks in the future.
The strategy of a company, then, can intuitively, and, in practice,
be identified as an important input to the design of models and to the
choice of priorities within the set of application areas.
Organizational Context : The organizational context within which the
modeling activity taikes place has already been identified as an important
source of explemation in respect to the degree of modeling success. It
can also influence the design of models, in the sense that the available
expertise to support modeling may be an explicit factor in design choices.
Within the organizational context, we include a set of variaibles,
interacting with one another, and producing collectively an ambience
which influences the probability of modeling success. For example, in-
cluded within the organizational set of variables are the following: a
shared perception of a need to upgrade organizational technology to sup-
port the decision process; the general state of the administrative systems
delineated to manage the planning and control process in the organization;
the data processing technology used by the organization; the staff expertise
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in modeling and in the general area of managing inforriiation as a resource
in the organization; and the managerial control of data processing projects
in the organization, in particular, the willingness to locate the control
of decision-support projects outside the data processing department:. In
a less specific way, we would also include within this set of variables
such things as the organizational climate and managerial style. Crucial
in regard to the management and use of information in the organization,
and to modeling in particular, is the general degree of trust within the
organization that information can be shared without undue fear of the
abuse of that trust in respect to political uses of the information.
User : Within the general category of user, it is vital to distinguish
between the direct user of a model, and the indirect user. As noted
previously, the direct users of models are seldom line managers. Rather,
direct users are usually staff managers within the planning and control
organizations supporting the line fiinction. But more important is the
distinction between a single user, multiple users within the same orga-
nizational unit, and multiple users widespread throughout the organization.
This latter distinction-single user, rr, iltiple user within the same
departm.ent, multiple users throughout the organization - is an important
aspect in terms of explaining model structures. Lucas [57] addresses this
in his framework of model implementation. In essence, he sees the imple-
mentation process as an incremental diffusion of innovation in the organi-
zation. However, the intended scope, in an organizational sense, of the
application of a model is an important variable affecting the design of
the model. The wider the intended scope, the more challenging it is to
capture a com.mon cognitive set as a basis for the model's processing
algorithms. Since organizations are comprised of at least partially
differentiated groups of people, each group dominated by its own specialized
expertise, goal sets and relevant environmental perceptions, usage of a
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niodel as an implementation objective requires a design approach which
accomodates the cognitive and motivational variety within the organization.
Managerial Process and Model Characteristics
Turning to the problem area dimension of typology, Anthony [5],
in a seminal contribution to the managerial literature, proposes an analysis
of the management process into three relatively distinct sub-sets: "strategic
planning", which is concerned with decisions about organizational goals and
business objectives; "management control", the decision process concerned with
acquiring and using resources effectively and efficiently in accomplishing
objectives; and "operational control", the decision processes associated with
carrying out specific defined tasks. VHiile Anthony's framework appears to
derive from the bureaucratic theory of organization, in that he views strategic
planning as residing almost exclusively with top management, the dual criteria
he proposes for judging the resource allocation process, effectiveness and
efficiency, suggest a dynamic, entrepreneurial process co-existing alongside
the more traditional emphasis on minimization of resource usage to produce a
specified quantity of output. A significant feature of Anthony's framework
concerns the interface between strategic planning and management control,
which is handled by a discrete activity which some authors refer to as "long
range planning", but which Anthony prefers to call "programming". The important
distinction which Anthony draws between programming and the budgeting fonn of
planning used in the main body of activities embraced by management control
concerns the intellectual and information structures of each. Programming
uses as its focus sets of activities related to and justified in terms of the
implementation of business strategies of the enterprise, independent of the
defined authority and responsibility structure of the managerial organization;
management control, in contrast, is dominated by an analysis of activities
from the standpoint of the defined organization structure, that is to say,
in relation to the bureaucratic procedures the organization uses for
translating plans into action.
Lorange and Vancil [56] develop Anthony's franiework, especially in the
context of large, divisionalized companies. However, they see strategic
planning as necessarily extending throughout the managerial hierarchy,
differentiated in focus and substance by the particular scope of responsibility
at a given level in the organization. And they stress the importance of relating
the design of planning systems to the management structure of the organization.
As an illustration, they prescribe for a divisionalized company a two-dimensional,
three-by-three matrix. One dimension differentiates the planning process into
objective setting, long-range planning on a program structure, and budgeting,
linked sequentially by a schedule of planning activities and by a transference
of information; the other dimension differentiates the organization into
corporate management, division management and functional management. Hierarchical
direction is achieved by an interactive but predominantly top-dovm parameterizing
of the planning systems at each level, whereby targets at a higher level become
objectives at the immediately lower level, and are then translated through the
planning process into operating targets for use as decision making criteria at
that level. The authors are well aware of the complexity and iterative nature
of the organizational planning process. However, they distill from this
complexity a clearly defined path through the process, around which they
develop a set of administrative logistics for its managament.
The initial thrust of Lorange and Vancil 's work on the planning process
was concerned with the development of general prescriptions for the design of
the related administrative procedures. Subsequently, however, they turn their
attention to the identification of important situational variables on which to
modify the general prescriptions in a contingent manner. One of the most
important variables which they identify is the degree of perceived need for
adaptation. They distinguish two different functions of the organization and
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the planning support required for each - an adaptive function concerned with
achieving an appropriate fit between the enterprise and its dynamic
environment, especially its product-market environment, and an integrative
function which they interpret as being concerned with managing an established
set of activities. These functions appear to be broadly consistent with the
distinction made by Anthony between the effectiveness and efficiency criteria
respectively, although Lorange and Vancil are interpreting this more
substantively into the organization's control strategy. They suggest that
the relative balance between the two functions is an important aspect to be
considered in the choice of control strategy; moreover, there is an implication
of a "zero-sum" tradeoff where attention to one may be attained at the expense
of attention to the other. This could stem from a premise that the managerial
resource is fixed in quantity, which may be roughly true in the short terra,
but not necessarily true in the longer term. More importantly, however,
considering the focus is on the administrative systems of an organization,
there seems no reason in principle to suppose the integrative function should
inevitably be accorded less salience in the management of the organization as
a result of a perceived need for, and emphasis accorded to, adaptation. There
exists the possibility, for example, of developing more efficient information
processing procedures to enhance and extend the managerial capability of the
organization in order to fulfill the requirements of both functions.
Ansorr [4] argues the preceding point in greater detail, but from
the standpoint of a more general historical perspective. He analyzes the
managerial task into "societal management," concerned with the broad in-
stitutional role of an organization in society, "entrepreneurial management,"
concerned with the longer-term development of the organization's resources
and capabilities, and "competitive managem.ent , " concerned with the
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efficient use of present resources within existing market constraints. These
three functions, he suggests, are linked and balanced through the administrative
systems of the organization. He argues that new techniques introduced within
the administrative systems are additive, rather than supplanting existing
techniques, and aimed at coping with additional dimensions of the management
task as these become better understood, or as they emerge from a continuing
evolution and change of organizations and the society in which they function.
From the research evidence, it seems important to expand on Lorange and
Vancil's, and Ansoff's, frameworks by recognizing two extremes of the adaptive,
or entrepreneurial, function. On the one hand, we can identify "enterprise
adaptation", a process concerning the management of major discontinuities in
the size, scope and nature of the enterprise, and "competitive adaptation",
a process of incremental entrepreneurial development stemming in an organic
way from the established businesses in which the organization is engaged.
The importance of this distinction is that the organizational strategy for
the control of each may be, and frequently is, quite different. Enterprise
adaptation is more likely to be handled at a Lop management level, perhaps
supported by specialized corporate staff groups; but competitive adaptation
is almost inevitably managed through the same line organization as is handling
the established businesses, because it is within this organization that the
relevant knowledge and expertise reside, and they are ultimately responsible
for carrying out the specific programs relating to the function. Therefore,
the control of the competitive adaptation and maintenance functions are likely
to be vested in the same line organization. The question arises, then, as to
whether the planning and monitoring requirements of each can be successfully
differentiated in the administrative and information processing procedures so
that each function is satisfactorily catered for in the management process.
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Figure 3 indicates the differentiated focus in relation to the suggested
functional analysis, along with the different emphases of the support systems
in each case.
FIGURE 8 : A Functional Analysis of the Managerial Process
And Related Support Systems
FUNCTION FOCUS
ENTERPRISE ADAPTATION MAJOR CHANGE -
DISCONTINUITIES-
ORGANIZATIONAL
STRATEGY AND
INFOR>LATION SUPPORT
MANAGE-IENT OF
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-RESERVED TO TOP
MANAGEMENT
SHARED, DIFFUSE
RESPONSIBILITY;
HIGH INFORiMATION
CONTENT
COMPETITIVE ADAPTATION INCREMENTAL CHA.NGE -
CONTINUOUS
MANAGEMENT OF
RESULTS
MAINTENANCE-
i
-EFFICIENT AND
RESPONSIVE OPERATIONS
DELEGATED, FOCUSED
RESPONSIBILITY;
LOW INFORMATION
CONTENT
As suggested in the figure, the essence of the adaptive component
of the mangerial process is the management of uncertainty and risk, these
being generated by a perceived need to develop new capaibilities to ensure
the longer-term viability and success of the organization. Since uncertainty
is characterized by a lack of relevant knowledge, the information processing
to deal with the management of uncertainty is aimed at encouraging information
flow, from a multiplicity of sources. Consequently, the support systems are
designed to make information easily transferred from one organizational level
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to another, and digestable by a fairly simple calculative mechanism in
order to increase the generality of the model; at the same time, responsi-
bility for input of information is widely dispersed through the organiza-
tion, and the penalties for being wrong are widely shared, in order to
minimize psychological obstacles in the human system towards sharing in-
formation.
By contrast, the essence of the maintenance component is the maximiza-
tion of short-term results through efficient exploitation of established
capabilities, responsively to the stochastic variability in the organization's
operating systems. Since this part of the management process is carried
out in conditions of relatively high familiarity with the significant fac-
tors which impact performance, the organization can afford to reduce the
information flows concerned with this part of the management task, by de-
fining responsibilities in a focussed manner and allowing people to get on
with the job in a delegated mode. Indeed, as part of the differentiation
process, this conscious supppression of information transfer, relating to
the maintenance functions, is essential; otheirwise, these information flows
may overwhelm, or at least make more difficult to discern, the significant
or relevant message content in the information flows pertaining to the
adaptive function. Effective differentiation requires individual attention
to each system, but it also requires joint attention to the way in which
each, in operation, will interact with the other; this aspect of the design
avoids the zero-sum connotation referred to earlier, since it expands the
managerial capacity of the organization.
The analysis to this point, however, has not dealt with a crucial
aspect of the differentiation, namely an assessment of the need to adapt
in the first instance. Adaptation is costly, both in terms of the expendi-
ture of economic resources and in terms of human psychology. Adaptation
is essentially a destructive process, since it is concerned with selectively
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diGcarding an existing state of affairs to be replaced with a new state of
affairs - rew products, production and distribution processes, and new
organizational relationships, skills, information systems and procedures.
Early in the discussion, the problem was noted of recognizing the need for
a decision, an aspect of decision making which is not adequately dealt
with in cognitive theory. Nor is it adequately dealt with in managerial
theory. Strategic planning nay be seen as attempting to address this is-
sue; nevertheless, the literature, and to some extent the practice, of
strategic planning confuses the issues of strategic assessment, the pro-
cess by which the need for adaptation is handled, and strategic plans,
the process of deciding how best to proceed along defined goal paths.
In other words, the means-ends schema is confused in the theory and meth-
odology of strategic planning. Hanssnan [38] argues this point in a
powerful paper, by reference principally to the static-dynamic dimension
of modeling. He asserts that static, time-independent, models are more
appropriate for strategic planning, because the essential methodology is
one of state-preference choice amongst future possible states of the
enterprise-environment system. The more commonly encountered models,
which link states of the enterprise through sequential time periods, are
more appropriate for the choice of tactics of how to reach a new state,
rather than for choices about the state itself.
In the research sample three companies (H, J and K) were using models
to support a corporate strategic assessment process, and one company (I)
v/as moving towards this type of modeling support. At first, it was dif-
ficult to discern this type of use as a specific phenomenon, because of
the multiple uses to which modeling systems are put in practice. The same
output generator can be used for several purposes - for example, strategic
assessment at the corporate level, support of decision making, such as
acquisition analysis, and appraisal of plans and budgets submitted by
divisional manageir.ent; the distinguishing feature in respact to the mod-
eling system is the source and nature of the input data rather than the
calculating and output modules.
At the business unit, or divisional level, the differentiation between
strategic assessment and strategic planning is even more difficult to
discern than at the corporate level. Perhaps because of the more limited
scope of range of strategic options, and because of the lesser degrees of
uncertainty involved, it is more feasible to combine the assessment and
planning processes into a single phase. Nevertheless, some degree of
differentiation could be observed in two cases (L and P) . More important
is the differentiation between the maintenance aspect, incorporated into
the construction of a base case along with defined contingencies around
the base casi (reactive response) , and the adaptive component, incorporated
into strategic overlays on the base case (proactive response) . At the
f\anctional level, within the research cases, the strategic assessment
aspect was not observed. It appears as if major functional adaptation is
in fact handled at a higher organizational level, along with the total
business planning function. In essence, much of the major uncertainty in
the planning process appears to be abosrbed at the corporate and divi-
sional levels of the organization. As a consequence, functional level
planning is conducted within a fairly well-specified environment. An in-
teresting effect of this is the feasibility of resorting to considerably
more sophisticated modeling, in a decision-science sense.
In the Lorange-Vancii fraj:nework of the administrative logistics of
the planning process, a central concern addressed by the authors is the
process by which the organization manages uncertainty: uncertainty first
of all in the external environment, and secondly the reduction of internal
uncertainty within the organization as external uncertainty is resolved
and the means of dealing with it communciated and agreed upon throughout
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the organization. During the planning process, the authors emphasize
the development and sharing of information to explore threats and feasible
options, and the gradual narrowing down to a particular set of options;
in other v/ords, the essence of the planning process is a carefully mana-
ged dialectic within the organization. To move too rapidly to a sophis-
ticated analysis of how best to do specific things may potentially defeat
the openness of the dialectic process. It could result in analytical
resources being devoted to an inappropriately narrow range of options at
too early a stage of the sequence. But perhaps even more damaging is the
possibility that the weight of sophisticated analysis involved in specific
resource-use types of decision methodology could intrude on the process
in an undesirable way, upsetting the political balance of the process.
The analytical methodology could become a determining force, a normative
imperative rather than a supportive device. There is reason, therefore,
quite consciously to exclude from models supporting the organizational
planning process decision methodologies which are designed to address
different issues from those for which the process itself is designed.
There is- of course, something of a tautology in the preceding rea-
soning. How can the orgamization know what are feasible and potentially
worthwhile options without first identifying, analyzing and evaluating a
fairly comprehensive set of these? It cannot. Therefore, the analytical,
decision-specific type of process has to be conducted simultaneously with,
and supportive to , the dialectic process concerned with wider communica-
tion and ultimately with goal formation and direction setting. The ques-
tion really concerns one of differentiating the two intellectual processes
in the information support systems of the organization. Within an orgaini-
zational unit, or responsibility center, there are two environments to be
managed: an external, or operating environment, and an internal, or
organizational environment. In relation to its own operating environment.
the management of the unit has to be concerned with the development of
analytical methodologies, which may be incorporated into formal modeling
systems, for dealing with the specific types of uncertainties and oppor-
ti:mities perceived at that level. And it also has to extract information
developed from this, and rearrange it in a suitable way to feed it into
the information flows specified for the wider organizational environment.
In moving towards a typology of models, then, it is important to
distinguish between models which are developed to support the communication
process between organizational units as part of the organizational dia-
lectic concerned with goal formation, direction setting and general
resource allocations, and models which are developed to support specific
types of decision. The latter tend to be external to the organizational
planning aiic* control process, part of the differentiation and specializa-
tion of skills in the organization; and concerned with determining the
best way to do things once it has been decided they should be done. The
former are central to the support of the integrative, or coordinative,
function of organizational planning and control.
The discussion to this point is summarized in Figure 9, and some of
the main characteristics of modeling systems, in relation to the managerial
application, are identified.
In general, models move from small, inexpensive, supportive systems
in the top, left-hcind comer of the figure, to large, costly and relatively
more assertive systems in the bottom, right-hand corner of the figure.
The more sophisticated modeling, in terms of economic analysis and decision-
science techniques, are contained in the right-hand column; in the first
three columns, the systems are generally designed to support an organiza-
tional dialectic, and, therefore, typically exclude sophisticated analytical
techniques. Sensitivity analysis is the most common analytical methodology
in these systems. One point to .note, however, is that relatively large
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and coinplex rr.odais are often used at the corporate level, especially
in the responsibility budgeting phase when interfacing with business
unit managements. These models are used by corporate staff to analyse
plans and budgets subinitted by business unit managements, with the purpose
of detecting any unexplained discontinuities in these plans, or unrealistic
trends. As such, the modeling systems have to be capable of processing
relatively large amounts of information. Moreover, as experience is
gained in the use of these modeling systems, one observes an increasing
level of sophistication being built in to the models to represent such
things as the interdependence between divisions' operations.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
Definit_ve general conclusions in the area of modeling support of
the organizational decision making and control process are difficult to
draw because of the complexity of the subject area, and because of the
situational characteristics of each case. Moreover, the research of
this study was exploratory in nature rather than elaborately exhaustive.
Nevertheless, some useful conclusions do seem to be justified, and some
relevant questions can be posed to guide further research.
It appears clear that computer-based modeling support is gaining
acceptance in business organizations, and that the results are sufficiently
encouraging to lead one to expect the development of this type of com-
puter application to continue at a rapid pace. Managements are becoming
increasingly comfortaible with the use of computers in a decision-support
mode. Hov;ever, the combination of decision-science methodologies and the
data-handling capabilities of the computer is not as advanced as one
might suppose from a reading of some of the literature. ^'Jhile formal
methods of analyzing risk and optimizing resource commitments are observed
in practice, these are generally in well-defined, delimited areas of the
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organization's activities, and occur at a level well below, and external
to, the .main process of defining goals and the direction of the firm and
making general resource allocation and financing decisions. Jloreover,
while normative decision theor'/ works principally within an economic
frcunework, corporate planning, budgeting and monitoring of performance
is still dominated by an accounting framework. In some organizations,
project, or program, planning utilizes an economic framework, but ulti-
mately programs are merged into a general information base organized with-
in the accounting structure.
In the case of probabilistic formulations, there seems reason to
believe that the form in which this methodology has been developed in the
literature is not well-suited to the general management problem in organi-
zations. Other approaches, such as the use of sensitivity analysis, con-
tingency planning, and gearing the planning cycle to the resolution of
uncertainty, appear better attuned to the problem. In this particular
area, it does not appear as if the lack of a fonr.al risk analysis in
ciodels is something which will change radically with further learning and
development of organizational planning procedures; nonethe-less, it is
clearly a dimension of the problem which requires further research.
In the case of optimizing and goal programming formulations, however,
the matter does not seem to be so clear-cut. This kind of approach would,
on the surface, add considerable information to the corporate planning
process. A number of im.plementation obstacles can, of course, readily
be identified. First, organizations lack relevant, or stable, information
concerning such things as the behavior of returns as a function of the
rate and mix of investment. This occurs because investments, once made,
eventually get absorbed into the general information base which is orga-
nized on an accounting structure, and which records average, rather than
marginal, returns. Moreover, the critical, or scarce, resource keeps
changing due to turbulent change in the environment; it is all very well
to think of returns to capital, as if capital were the scarce resource,
but business planning is ultimately concerned with the dual aspect of
capital, namely the real resources which are being acquired by the ex-
penditure of capital, and the availability, cost and returns to these real
resources are seldont stable. Secondly, there is a very real conceptual
difficulty in developing models in such a v/ay as to make them amenable
to a goal programning approach. And finally, many companies appear to be
operating at a point far removed from an efficient financial equilibrium
between the demand for funds and the availability of funds; thus, manage-
ments may very well feel that they do not require sophisticated models
to tell them the general direction in which they should be moving the
enterprise—indeed, these models might provide infor.Tiati:n which would
be regarded as irritating rather than helpful.
While these obstacles may be substantial, they may in any event only
provide part of the answer to the reluctance to attempt to develop and use
optimizing forms of models in the corporate and business planning pro-
cesses. Management is, in the final analysis, a matter of politics, con-
cerned with the preservation of discretion to choose and to implement
choices. Improved analytical support may enhance managerial power and
effectiveness, but it also has the potential to diminish it. There is
certainly a tendency amongst managers to equate an optimizing formulation
with an assertive, rather than a supportive, model; that is to say, the
rr-odel is endowed with some degree of authority by virtue of its logic
structure. Thus, the possibility is introduced that this kind of model
may shift power towards those who are closest to the design and direct
use of the model. Most organization theory is concerned with the distri-
bution of power and authority hierarchically in an organization, and this
is an appropriate perspective. But it is incomplete, because it does not
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recognize the relevant issues of niaintaining a pov/er balance within orga-
nizational levels. In reality, for example, corporate management is not
a monolith, but is itself subject to divisions which require a sensitive
political accomodation to maintain in effective balance.
The decision paradigm within which most normative modeling is devel-
oped assumes the need for an explicit goal set to guide planning and
resource allocations. Grinyer and Morburn [33] in the U.K. have conducted
field research which casts som.e doubt on this prescription, and Quinn [76]
in this country, in a more polemical model, but based on substantial em-
pirical experience, argues that managements have good reason to avoid
explicit and detailed goal statements. Traenkle et. al. [88], from their
survey of the users of financial planning m.odels, observe that companies
with a high growth rate of sales and profits are less li/cely to use such
methodologies thaji companies with low growth rates. This suggests that
modeling support of the planning and control process may be something which
managements resort to to correct major problems, rather than a technology
which sustains entrepreneurial growth. The evidence of this study appears
to support this contention. For advocates of models, this may carry some
uncomfortable implications; nevertheless, there are high-growth companies
making effective use of modeling system^s. Thus, an important research
question would appear to be an identification of modeling in support of
high-growth, rapidly-changing organizations, and how such modeling might
differ from the kind of modeling used by mature, stable organizations.
The longitudinal aspect of the research study allowed an investigation
of the modeling process through time. In many respects, this provides the
most interesting insight, contributing to an understanding of both modeling
as an organizational process, and the wider development of organizational
procedures for plan-ning, processing information, decision making, monitoring
and analyzing performance. The modeling phenomenon cannot be studied in
isolation from the whole context in which it taj-:es place. Or.e of the most
exciting aspects of the research study v/as the realization that an examina-
tion of formal models appears to provide objective, albeit incomplete,
evidence about the cognitive processes involved in organizational planning
and control. Moreover, viewing control as an organizational learning pro-
cess, the evolution of modeling systems through time may provide powerful
evidence about the mechanisms underlying this learning. Since this is a
vitally important area, and one v;hich has lacked objective and efficient
research methodologies, this may be the most important research avenue
to develop in the future.
For the future, we can expect to see a sustained and rapid growth in
the use of modeling systems. Major developments which organizations in the
forefront of this will probably be pursuing lie in three main areas: in
the linking of models one to another cind to the design of, and extraction
of data from, the transaction data bases; in modeling key aspects of the
environment and the way these interact with the enterprise; and in simulating
the behavior of the organization itself under different conditions of
delegation of authority and measurement of performance.
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